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Although research on equity theory has waned, understanding the influence of 
different referent groups remains an important unanswered question in the justice 
literature (Greenberg, 2003). This study proposes to increase understanding of the 
referent selection process in two ways. One is by applying a theory explicitly focused on 
pay, the reflective theory of pay (Thierry, 1998). In addition, the current research will 
employ policy-capturing to effectively capture the relative influence of different referent 
groups (Bordia & Blau, 2003; Law & Wong, 1998). Results indicated that perceptions of 
the internal referent group showed the strongest relationship with pay satisfaction. In 
addition, there was evidence that equity sensitivity and the control and spending 
meanings of pay moderated the relationship between the external referent group and pay 
satisfaction. 
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Introduction 
The Symbolic Meaning of Money 
“It’s not about money; it’s about respect.”-Anonymous
While the salaries of most individuals are private, professional athletes frequently 
have their pay and contract negotiations open to the public. Consider the case of Ty Law. 
In February 2004, his team, the New England Patriots, won the Super Bowl--the ultimate 
organizational goal in the NFL. From 2001-2004, Law was the highest paid player in the 
world at his position. But by spring 2004, the latter was no longer true, as a colleague on 
another team was now the highest paid. As a result, Law publicly voiced dissatisfaction 
with his $8.5 million/year contract. Despite a salary that falls within the 99th percentile of 
all wage earners in the United States (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Mills, 2004), Law was 
more concerned with the relative size of his salary in comparison to his colleagues. In 
particular he said: “I deserve to be the highest-paid cornerback in the NFL. . . the team 
that I've proven that for . . . doesn't realize or can't see [that] they're not giving me the 
proper respect or the contract that I deserve. It’s a new market right now, and I need to be 
at the top of that too.” (Smith, 2004, pg. 36)  Some of Law’s other quotes illustrate his 
characterization of the salary issue as one of respect, such as when he argued that a $26 
million contract offer from the Patriots was “an insult. . . a slap in the face” (Smith, 2004,  
pg. 42).   
The above example pointedly illustrates the equity construct is alive and well. 
Equity research has shown that pay satisfaction is driven more by a function of how one’s 
salary compares with relevant others rather than pay adequacy (Scholl, Cooper, & 
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McKenna, 1987). Law reinforces this point when he refers to his salary in comparison to 
his highest paid colleague. His comment about “respect” suggests his salary represents 
more than an ability to be financially secure, but also represents a measure of respect for 
his work performance. He’s been quoted as saying “It’s not about the money” (Smith, 
2004, pg. 42). Clearly, if it is not the money, something else is going on. His feelings of 
inequity may be related to perceived respect more so than money.  
In organizational research on compensation, Mowday (1996) has noted that one of 
the dominant paradigms for understanding pay comparisons has been Adams’ (1963; 
1965) equity theory. Equity theory suggests that individuals determine equity by 
comparing their ratio of inputs to outcomes against a corresponding ratio for a 
comparison other. Feelings of inequity have been shown to drive pay satisfaction 
(Summers & Hendrix, 1991), and this general model (see Figure 1) has been used to 
explain reactions to pay in organizations (Kulik & Ambrose, 1992). The case of Ty Law 
provides anecdotal evidence that some individuals are especially attuned to what others 
earn. 
However, recent research has shifted away from studying equity theory due to 
theoretical problems that empirical research has found difficult to reconcile (Greenberg 
2003; Mowday, 1996). Among these problems is one that is particularly relevant to the 
current paper. Specifically, it has been difficult to predict or determine who people would 
choose as their standard of comparison. As a result, it is difficult to test certain 
predictions of equity theory. Although research has shown that referent related equity is 
related to pay satisfaction (see Figure 1), the particular pay referent that is the most 
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important frequently shifts between studies (e.g., Taylor & Vest, 1992; Goodman, 1974; 
Hills, 1980).   
It is possible that this research literature has found inconsistent results because 
researchers have failed to consider some individuals attach more symbolic meanings to 
money than others (Furnham & Argyle, 1998; Thierry, 1998, 2001; Mitchell & Mickel, 
1999). Money may symbolically represent spending power, it could represent recognition 
for good job performance, or it could represent social status. Scholars have recently 
suggested that compensation research needs to account for individual differences in the 
meaning of money (Barber & Bretz, 2000; Heneman & Judge, 2000; Furnham & Argyle, 
1998; Rynes & Gerhart, 2000). Previous research has also indicated that the multiple 
meanings of pay constitute an important individual difference (Miedema, 1994; Mitchell 
& Mickel, 1999; Tang et al., 2004) when studying pay satisfaction. While there have 
been few other attempts to empirically test individual differences in the meaning of 
money, these researchers underscored that understanding such differences may help our 
understanding of the constructs that influence pay satisfaction.  
Consistent with this reasoning, research has shown that the meaning of money is 
subjectively determined (e.g., Tang, 1992; 1993; 1995; Shaw; 1996, Miedema, 1994) and 
that these different meanings are predictive of pay satisfaction (Tang, Luna-Arocas, 
Sutarso, & Tang, 2004).  Unfortunately, when researchers typically attempt to understand 
the influence and meaning of money, they borrow constructs and theories from the 
motivation or social comparison domains (Thierry, 1992). Thierry has posited that 
treating money as an objective, quantifiable variable may overlook the symbolic meaning 
that people attach to money and the behaviors affected by this symbolic meaning. As a 
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result, Thierry has designed a theory of pay with an explicit focus on the symbolic value 
of pay, the “reflection” theory of pay (Thierry, 1992; 2001). 
Thierry uses the metaphor of a mirror to suggest that pay itself has no 
significance, rather pay reflects subjective meanings that are connected to an individual’s 
self-identity.  For example, individuals who pride themselves on being a significant 
contributor to the organization may look to the size of their pay as a representation (i.e., 
reflection) of their value to the organization. Then again, individuals who are concerned 
about financial stability may look to the size of their pay as a representation of their own 
spending ability. Therefore, the meaning of pay is said to be a result of the “reflection” of 
concepts critical to individuals’ self-identity. I predict that these different meanings are 
related to pay satisfaction such that individuals who see more symbolic meanings in pay 
will be more sensitive to pay inequities (see Figure 2).  
This paper seeks to extend equity theory by proposing that the relationship 
between pay inequity and pay satisfaction is dependent on the amount of subjective 
meanings a person attaches to pay.  I further argue that the impact of these meanings on 
pay satisfaction varies according to the employee’s choice of referent (e.g., internal, 
external, same education). By simultaneously incorporating the meanings of pay and 
equity sensitivity into the compensation literature, I expect to gather evidence as to how 
individual differences illuminate the nature and effects of the referent comparison 
process. I contend that considering the symbolic meaning of pay will increase our 
understanding of how individuals tie their self-identity to money.  
I will begin by discussing one of the oldest theories of distributive justice: equity 
theory. One of the building blocks of equity theory is the role of social comparison, so I 
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will discuss these concepts as they relate to pay, along with some of the difficulties 
encountered in trying to predict referent selection. I will also review individual 
differences that may be relevant to equity and pay satisfaction. Included in this review is 
the construct of equity sensitivity, which has emerged as an individual difference variable 
that can be used to understand reactions to inequity (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1985; 
1987). Additionally, Thierry (1992; 2001) has suggested that the symbolic meanings of 
pay vary from person to person. This symbolic meaning does not appear to be captured in 
the Huseman et al. equity sensitivity measure.  As a result, I expect that understanding the 
symbolic value of money will explain variance in pay satisfaction above and beyond that 
of equity sensitivity.   
After outlining research on these individual differences, I discuss a study that tests 
how these differences impact reactions to pay inequity. I assert that two individual 
difference constructs are especially relevant to understanding the influence of referents: 
equity sensitivity, which is defined as a personal preference for a particular balance of 
rewards and inputs (in comparison to others), and the symbolic meaning of money.  
Social Comparisons 
Research on social comparison has suggested that individuals look to others to 
judge the fairness of certain personally relevant outcomes like compensation (Suls & 
Wills, 1991). However, the extant research on social comparison is conflicting, such that 
individuals sometimes select similar referents and at other times dissimilar referents, a 
difference which has been difficult to reconcile (Greenberg, 2003). This topic has been 
frequently studied in organizations, but it is still unclear if it is possible to identify how 
people select a target of comparison (Mowday, 1996; Kulik & Ambrose, 1992).  Previous 
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research has investigated who people tend to choose as referents, and this data suggests 
that individuals tend not to differentiate between individual referent categories but rather, 
they form a mental composite that combines multiple referents (e.g., Taylor & Vest, 
1992; Summers & DeNisi, 1990). While these studies have been helpful, Kulik and 
Ambrose (1992) have suggested that this research has done little to investigate individual 
differences in referent selection and interpretation. For example, important questions such 
as: “Do referents mean the same to everyone?” and “Does everyone compare themselves 
to the same set of referents?” have not been addressed.  Depending on the sample in a 
study, different referents may emerge as the most salient to an individual.  
One useful framework for understanding individual reactions to social 
interactions has been social exchange theory (Adams 1963, 1965; Homans, 1961; 
Patchen, 1961). Generally, this framework holds that individuals make contributions and 
receive rewards for their contributions. Individuals will make assumptions about the 
rewards they expect from an exchange, and the logical basis for these assumptions comes 
from social interactions, specifically comparisons against others. There have been 
multiple theories of social comparison (Mowday, 1996). In the next section of this paper, 
I will focus primarily on equity theory, one of the dominant theories governing 
distributive justice. One of the outstanding issues to be resolved in equity theory is the 
role of the referent other and the target individuals focus on when they make comparisons 
(Goodman, 1974; Kulik & Ambrose, 1992; Mowday, 1996). The research literature has 
made frequent attempts to resolve the role of the comparison other as it relates to 
compensation, however few have investigated the role of individual differences.  
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Equity Theory and Pay Satisfaction 
Equity theory (Adams, 1963; 1965) is considered one of the main theories of the 
social comparison process, and has been rigorously tested as a way to understand 
organizational behavior (Greenberg, 1994). The theory suggests that individuals compare 
their ratio of inputs to outcomes against those of a referent (comparison) other. If the 
individual determines that the ratio is unequal, there is said to be a state of inequity that 
leads to psychological tension. The individual can relieve this psychological tension by: 
actively changing their own inputs or outputs, cognitively distorting their inputs or 
outputs (justification), changing the comparison other, or leaving the field (quitting).  
Referent-related pay differentials are said to be the precursors to judgments of pay 
equity, which consequently impacts perceptions of pay satisfaction (Summers & Hendrix, 
1991). Research has looked to test whether pay satisfaction is best predicted by equity 
perceptions or by actual salary.  
Blau (1994) investigated the importance of referents in making judgments of pay 
satisfaction and pay equity. Participants were asked to indicate the importance and 
perceived pay levels of a number of referents along with their own actual salary and pay 
satisfaction. The results indicated that pay inequity was the best predictor of pay 
satisfaction, more so than actual salary. In a similar vein, both Sweeney, McFarlin, and 
Inderrieden (1990) and Summers and DeNisi (1990) have found that pay inequity 
accounts for unique variance in pay satisfaction that is not predicted by actual salary 
level. It also appears that pay inequity not only predicts attitudes (i.e., pay satisfaction), 
but also behavior, as Patchen (1961) has found that perceptions of equity were more 
predictive of behavior (i.e., absences) than actual salary. 
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Research has also attempted to test the strength of the relationship between 
inequity and pay satisfaction. For example, Homans (1961) conducted early research that 
served as a precursor to much of the theory surrounding social comparison. He studied a 
utility company with two job types: cash poster and ledger clerk. Due to an irregularity in 
the compensation system, the pay for the two positions was the same despite the fact that 
ledger clerk was the promotional step after cash poster which involved more thinking and 
responsibility. Homans (1961) found that the ledger clerks were dissatisfied with their 
pay in comparison to the cash posters and felt they deserved “just a few dollars more 
[than the cash posters] to show that the job is more important” (pg. 261). This appears to 
be early evidence suggesting employees’ pay satisfaction may be partially determined as 
a result of social comparison in the work environment. One of the reasons for the 
popularity of many social exchange theories may be that they have much in common with 
intuitive, commonsense assumptions about the nature of individuals (Mowday, 1996).   
However, there are certain propositions of social comparison that need more study 
and operationalization (Goodman & Friedman, 1971; Mowday, 1996; Greenberg, 2003), 
including how to predict the target of comparison as well as how the inputs and outputs 
of the comparison other are perceived. Studying referents has been difficult partly 
because the number and classification of referents is almost infinite, and can include the 
self, generalized others, promises made by the organization, external employees, 
employees in the same organization, employees in the same department, friends, and 
even family members (Goodman, 1974; Taylor & Vest, 1992; Law & Wong, 1998; Hills, 
1980).  Frequently the comparison other is ambiguous; if different subjects use different 
referents, interpretation of empirical results can become problematic. A number of 
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studies have attempted to more closely define not only the individuals who form the basis 
of pay-related comparisons but also the range of responses associated with making 
different comparisons. I will begin by outlining some of the more significant studies in 
referent selection.  
One of the most important referent selection studies was that of Goodman (1974), 
who posited that referent selection was based on both the information availability and 
personal relevance of the referent. Goodman (1974) went further to describe the 
processes behind these two drivers of referent choice. He suggested that information 
availability is determined by personal factors and salient elements in the target’s 
environment. As contact and exposure to a potential referent increases, the information 
available to make comparisons also increases. Thus, information availability can be 
impacted by factors ranging from social networks to the physical layout of the 
organization. Individual differences also may emerge in each person’s propensity to 
conduct a search for a referent other. Goodman has further suggested that referent 
relevance is determined by the instrumentality of the referent for fulfilling the 
psychological needs of the individual. These psychological needs can include a need for 
performance feedback, a need for achievement, or needs related to self-esteem. A referent 
may also be related to multiple needs, and these needs may vary in strength, making the 
referent more relevant. The relevance of a given referent may also be influenced by 
socialization processes, as individuals learn “appropriate” comparison targets.  
Instrumentality can also be influenced by the ease of making the mental calculation and 
socialization about who are appropriate referents.  
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Goodman (1974) also distinguished between three general classes of referents.  
“Other” includes all individuals (different from the self, or target) who may be in similar 
jobs or organizations, it also includes family, friends, social contacts, and even media 
reports. The “System” referents include aspects of the pay system and the administration 
of the compensation system. When an individual joins an organization, the membership 
connotes an implicit expectation between the individual and organization in regards to 
inputs and outcomes; this contract of ratios promised or expected by the target represents 
the “System” referent. The “Self” referent class includes input/outcome ratios that are 
unique to the individual, but different from what currently exists; this may include a 
comparison to a past job, an ability to fulfill the role of family provider, or future goals of 
the individual. 
In part one of Goodman’s study, participants were asked to overall indicate if they 
were satisfied with their pay. In a follow up interview, they were then asked how they 
determined their (dis)satisfaction. This qualitative data suggested that the determination 
of pay (dis)satisfaction is frequently influenced by comparisons to others. The use of 
referents was actually found to be more strongly related to pay satisfaction than objective 
measures such as actual salary, length of tenure, education, and age. Responses also 
indicated that people use multiple classes of referents at the same time to determine their 
satisfaction. The most frequently used referent was the class of “Other”, which includes 
referents both inside and outside the organization. However, individuals tended to use the 
“Other” category in conjunction with the other two categories (“System” and “Self”).  
The use of referents was also found to be more strongly related to pay satisfaction than 
“objective” measures such as actual salary, length of service, education, and age. Level of 
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professionalism (measured through conference attendance) was related to making more 
comparisons to others outside the organization. This could be due to the accessibility of 
this information for professionals as opposed to nonprofessionals. Overall, these 
interviews supported the role of comparison others in affecting pay satisfaction.  
Summers and DeNisi (1990) have recently attempted to replicate Goodman 
(1974). These authors extended the Goodman study by using a sample that cut across the 
geographic boundaries and socialization processes of one collection site. Using survey 
data, pay equity was assessed in comparison to nine different referents. Respondents were 
asked which referents were most important when they considered pay. Results indicated 
that 38% of the sample relied on a generalized referent not specifically inside or outside 
the organization, 35% of individuals used the self as a referent, 20% indicated using 
inside referents and 6% used an outside referent.  
In addition, individuals who perceived unfavorable inequity relative to a 
particular referent group tended to be more dissatisfied with their pay. This relationship 
was maintained regardless of the referent group used by the participant. Based on these 
findings, the authors hypothesized that people may use a number of generalized, non-
specific referents to form a gestalt as the basis for their comparisons.  That is, individuals 
know they compare their pay against someone or something, but when asked a specific 
target, it is difficult to predict the actual referent with any certainty. Summers and DeNisi 
(1990) suggest the use of a generalized referent in future research to capture the idea that 
people are unable to individuate their referents.  
 Overall, an examination of the past research on referent selection shows abundant 
evidence that individuals’ judgments of pay satisfaction are related to perceptions of 
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equity in comparison to referents (Goodman, 1974; Kulik & Ambrose, 1992; Taylor & 
Vest, 1992; Law & Wong, 1998; Summers & Hendrix, 1991; Summers & DeNisi, 1990; 
Sweeney et al., 1990). On the basis of this review, it was hypothesized that:  
Hypothesis 1: Referent related pay differentials are related to pay satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 2: Referent related pay differentials are a better predictor of pay satisfaction 
than actual salary. 
Referent Selection 
As previously indicated, one of the limitations of equity theory is that it makes no 
specific predictions about referent choice (Kulik & Ambrose, 1992). As these authors 
note, there has been an abundance of research attempting to reconcile this issue with no 
firm conclusions. It is apparent that people do compare their salary to others, however it 
appears that individuals may find it difficult to differentiate between the different 
referents that impact their overall judgments of equity. This gestalt may include 
perceptions of referents that include coworkers, neighbors, and colleagues in professional 
networks. The referent groups identified in some of the more significant previous 
research studies have been summarized in Table 1. 
Much of this research surrounding referent use and selection has two similarities. 
First, the classes of referents tend to be study-specific such that researchers have not used 
similar classifications of referents across studies, making research synthesis difficult. 
Second, individuals appear to use referents differentially, but may have difficulty 
making a distinction between them; indeed it may be that a generalized impression 
consisting of multiple referents forms in people’s minds as a source for comparison (i.e., 
Homans, 1961; Finn & Lee, 1972; Taylor & Vest, 1992; Hills, 1980; Heneman, Schwab, 
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Standal, & Peterson, 1978; Scholl et al., 1987; Ronen, 1986; Oldham, Kulik, Stepina, & 
Ambrose, 1986; Austin, McGinn, & Susmilch, 1980; Ambrose & Kulik, 1988). As a 
result, the comparison process is related to judgments of both equity and satisfaction, but 
it can be a challenge for both researcher and participant alike to determine the specific 
target of comparison.  
One potential shortcoming of this literature is an assumption that pay referents 
mean the same to everyone. Typically, past research on compensation and pay referents 
has presented a number of referents for participants to indicate which are salient or asked 
participants who they compared themselves to (e.g., Taylor & Vest, 1992; Hills, 1980). 
Results are then factor analyzed based on the full sample, an analytic procedure that may 
mask individual differences in referent selection.  
Taylor and Vest (1992) explored the extent to which public sector employees 
make comparisons and how these comparisons may impact pay satisfaction. Using a 
relatively large number of referent choices (17 choices), they asked participants to 
indicate how often they used each by asking on a strongly disagree to strongly agree scale 
“I often compare my pay to [  X  ].”  Based on a factor analysis of the results, the authors 
concluded that individuals tended to have four classes of referents: 1) external (those who 
work for other employers), 2) personal (friends, family, and one’s own accustomed pay), 
3) economic (cost of living and the amount of income required to meet the individual’s 
needs), and 4) ego (an ambiguous standard internal to the individual). These factors were 
then regressed onto pay satisfaction. Comparisons to the external class were most 
strongly related to feelings of pay dissatisfaction, which the authors note may have been 
due to the fact that this sample was entirely government employees. Interestingly, 
 
   14 
comparisons to the personal referent class tended to be related to increased feelings of 
pay satisfaction. The authors note the need for a multidimensional approach, because 
while the zero-order correlation of the economic referent was significantly related to pay 
satisfaction, a multiple regression analysis indicated that the economic factor added no 
unique variance to the prediction of pay satisfaction.  As a result, the authors urge 
researchers to note that 1) multiple referents are salient to individuals and 2) different 
referent groups may operate to impact pay satisfaction and dissatisfaction differentially. 
These results are typical of the referent research which has identified a number of 
potential referents. 
Some have suggested that understanding referent selection can be accomplished 
by examining the selection process over time. Stepina and Perrewe (1991) examined the 
selection process over time and found that despite the predictions of equity theory (that 
individuals may change a comparison other when dissatisfied), individuals tended to keep 
the same comparison other over time. The fact that the results were consistent with a 
dispositional, individualized approach led the authors to suggest future research on 
individual variables that may predict referent choice and pay satisfaction. 
More recently, a policy capturing approach has been suggested as a better way to 
capture the referent selection process (Law & Wong, 1998).  Policy capturing is a 
regression based methodology where participants are asked to make decisions in response 
to a series of scenarios featuring manipulated independent variables (Aiman-Smith, 
Scullen, & Barr, 2002). The decision outcomes are then regressed on the manipulated 
variables; the resulting regression coefficients are used to make inferences about 
participant preferences. Law and Wong (1998) assert that the problems with the direct 
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approach (i.e., asking participants which referents they use) for measuring referent 
selection are twofold. The first problem is that different respondents may use different 
sets of referents, which makes cross-individual comparison especially difficult. In 
addition, the frequency of comparison (with a certain referent group) is not necessarily 
equivalent to how strongly this referent affects pay satisfaction. To empirically support 
these challenges, the authors used three approaches to estimate the relative importance of 
various referent groups. The direct approach asked on a 7 point Likert scale whether 
individuals often compare their pay with five different referent groups: 1) family and 
close friends, 2) those with the same job internally, 3) those with the same job externally, 
4) those with the same education and experience, and 5) immediate supervisors. The 
inferential approach asked five statements about the participant’s pay satisfaction with 
respect to the previously listed referent groups. In the policy capturing approach, 
participants were placed into a hypothetical scenario with computer generated pay levels 
for themselves and members of the previously listed referent groups. Participants were 
then asked on a 6 point scale whether they were satisfied or dissatisfied with their own 
pay in this scenario. The policy capturing approach used the difference between the 
hypothetical pay level of the participant and various referent groups as predictors of the 
pay satisfaction measure to identify the most significant referent groups.   
The results of the direct approach suggest that most participants use multiple 
referents when comparing their pay with others. T-tests between indicated referent groups 
suggested that individuals tend to use all referent groups equally, except for the use of 
supervisor as a referent. As predicted, the frequency of the comparisons measured under 
the direct approach shows no relationship with pay satisfaction. Examining the results of 
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using the inferential approach reveals that although the use of all referent groups (except 
those with similar qualifications) are significantly related to satisfaction, internal 
colleagues appear to be the best predictor. When using the policy capturing approach, 
internal colleagues again appear to the best predictor of pay satisfaction. Furthermore, 
policy capturing revealed that individuals with the same education and experience are 
also an important referent of pay satisfaction. One of the benefits of the policy capturing 
approach is that it explained significantly more of the variance in pay satisfaction than the 
direct approach. The authors conclude that future research should be sure to distinguish 
between the frequency of comparison and the relative importance of various referents. In 
addition, their results support the explanatory power of using the policy capturing 
approach in compensation research. Thus, the current study employed the policy 
capturing approach.  
As previously noted, one general trend across referent selection studies is that it 
has been especially difficult to reconcile whether participants differentiate between 
referents when making judgments of equity. As referent selection is hypothesized to be 
related to the information available about that referent (Kulik  & Ambrose, 1992; 
Goodman, 1974), it seems logical to expect that more information will be available about 
internal referents. The previous research on referent selection tends to frequently find 
empirical evidence for an internal referent (Finn & Lee, 1972; Hills, 1980; Heneman et 
al., 1978; Scholl et al., 1987; Ronen, 1986; Oldham et al., 1986; Ambrose & Kulik, 
1988). Furthermore, internal colleagues have been identified as the best predictor of pay 
satisfaction using both an inferential approach and a policy capturing approach (Law & 
Wong, 1998). As a result, it was hypothesized that: 
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Hypothesis 3: Pay equity in reference to internal colleagues will be the strongest 
predictor of pay satisfaction.
Equity Sensitivity 
One conceptual advancement that has helped the understanding of equity theory, 
but has yet to be tied to referent choice, is the construct of equity sensitivity.  
Interestingly enough, reviews of equity theory have repeatedly called for a construct that 
could tap potential differences in reactions to equity (see Mowday, 1983; 1996). The 
norm of equity has predictive power, but there are exceptions that have already been 
demonstrated empirically in organizational justice research (e.g., Shapiro, 1975; 
Greenberg, 1978). The theory behind equity sensitivity proposes that individuals react in 
consistent but different ways to equity and inequity because they are differentially 
sensitive to equity issues (Huseman, Hatfield, Miles, 1985; 1987). As I will outline in the 
current section, this sensitivity is found to be related to individual attitudes and behaviors.  
Huseman et al. (1987) segment the population into 3 categories: Benevolents, 
Equity Sensitives, and Entitleds. In the initial version of the theory, it was posited that 
Benevolents prefer to have a higher work input to outcome ratio than others (i.e., a 
greater tolerance than others for being under-rewarded). Equity Sensitives are “in the 
middle,” have a preference for the equity norm, and would be the individuals most likely 
to follow the original predictions of equity theory closely. Entitleds, on the other hand, 
have a preference for a lower input to outcome ratio than others, which may be due to the 
fact that they have a high threshold for feeling indebted and a preference for over-reward 
situations.  
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The Equity Sensitivity Instrument (Huseman et al., 1985) is a 5 item scale. On 
each item, both an Entitled response and a Benevolent response are featured. Participants 
indicate their agreement with each statement by distributing 10 points between the two 
statements. The instrument is then scored by tallying the points allocated to the 
Benevolent responses, such that higher scores indicate Benevolence. King and Miles 
(1994) have established evidence that the ESI is psychometrically sound, with acceptable 
reliabilities and factor analyses that support its unidimensionality. They also 
demonstrated that the ESI is both discriminantly and convergently valid in relation to 
other pre-established scales.  
In some of the first empirical evidence supporting the equity sensitivity construct, 
Huseman et al. (1985) found that as predicted, under rewarded Benevolents tended to 
have higher job satisfaction than under rewarded Entitleds or Equity Sensitives. 
Furthermore, equitably rewarded Entitleds were less satisfied than Benevolents and 
Equity Sensitives with the same input/outcome ratios. In a later study, Miles, Hatfield, 
and Huseman (1989) found that when indicating a preference for amount of work inputs, 
the data is consistent with the theoretical propositions of the Equity Sensitivity construct. 
Consistent with Huseman et al. (1985), these authors found the preferred input/outcome 
ratio for Benevolents was lower than for the Equity Sensitives and Entitleds. However, 
they also found that the 3 Equity Sensitivity groups have relatively similar attitudes about 
the amount of outcomes they receive but dissimilar attitudes about how much work input 
should be necessary (given the level of outcomes). Thus, it may be that the Benevolents’ 
preference for high inputs that drives these results. Furthermore, King, Miles, and Day 
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(1993) found that Benevolents experience less distress than Entitleds when in either 
under-compensation or over-compensation scenarios.  
Consistent with these findings, Patrick and Jackson (1991) have found that 
Benevolents and Equity Sensitives were both more likely to alter their inputs upwards 
during over-reward conditions. Their data showed little distinction between groups in 
response to under-reward situations, perhaps because this situation was focused on a 
difference in outcomes (i.e., participants were paid less than referent others for doing the 
same work).  
More recently, Allen and White (2002) have made an important distinction that 
helps explain how individuals may respond to under-reward conditions. In one scenario, 
outcomes created the source of inequity. Specifically, participants received less pay than 
referent others for doing the same amount of work. Under these conditions, Entitleds 
significantly reduce their effort or transfer more than any other group. In the other 
scenario, a difference in inputs created the under-reward situation, as participants 
received the same amount of pay for doing more work than their referent. There were 
significant differences between all three Equity Sensitive groups in this condition. 
Specifically under the “input-underreward” conditions, Benevolents were significantly 
less likely to respond by reducing effort or attempting to transfer. Overall, the authors 
concluded that Entitleds are more likely to react to pay inequity, while Benevolents will 
be less likely to react as they appear to have a higher threshold for being under-
compensated. These aforementioned results seem to support the idea that equity 
sensitivity impacts the relationship between equity perceptions and pay satisfaction. This 
relationship is shown in Figure 3.  
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In addition to different preferences for inputs, outputs, and equity ratios, research 
has also shown that the different Equity Sensitivity groups may have different values. For 
example, King et al. (1993) found that Entitleds placed more importance on pay and that 
Benevolents place more importance on work characteristics when asked to fill out the Job 
Descriptive Index. Similarly, Miles, Hatfield, and Huseman (1994) found evidence that 
when asked to rate the importance of a series of job outcomes, Entitleds tended to place a 
greater focus on outcomes that were extrinsic and tangible. Benevolents, on the other 
hand, tended to place more of a focus on outcomes that were intrinsic and intangible.  
Currently, the ESI appears to have significant promise for helping to understand more 
about individual reactions to equity (Miles, Hatfield, & Huseman, 1994; Allen & White, 
2002). More specifically, the ESI can help organizational researchers to understand more 
about idiosyncratic reactions to compensation, as much of the empirical work on equity 
theory has focused on compensation (Mowday, 1996). As previously noted, research on 
equity theory has fallen out of favor as of late (Mowday, 1996; Greenberg, 2003) because 
it has not been able to predict reactions to equity, particularly regarding referent choice. 
Some have suggested that the investigation of individual differences may be a way to 
better comprehend reactions to equity (Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; Mitchell & Mickel, 
1999; Barber & Bretz, 2000). Past empirical research has found that Entitleds tended to 
be more likely to react to pay inequities than Benevolents (Allen & White, 2002). As a 
result, it may be that the relationship between pay inequity and pay satisfaction is 
influenced by the extent to which the individual is sensitive to equity (as shown in 3). As 
a result, it was hypothesized that:  
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Hypothesis 4: Equity Sensitivity will moderate the relationship between referent 
related pay differentials and pay satisfaction. 
 
Although the ESI may have promise as a moderating variable in pay level-pay 
satisfaction relationships, it has been argued that most organizational theories related to 
compensation are merely derived from more general theories of motivation or even social 
comparison (Thierry 1992; 2001). As a result, these theories fail to clarify the meaning of 
pay for an individual: a potentially multi-faceted meaning which may have an influence 
on pay satisfaction. Thierry has suggested that these meanings are a result of the special 
significance that pay takes on and that these meanings are tied to the individual’s self 
identity.   
In the following section, I contend that the strength of these symbolic meanings 
influences not only individual attitudes (Equity Sensitivity) but individual perceptions 
(responses to referent-related inequity) as well.  I will briefly discuss some of the 
organizational research that has attempted to measure some of the subjectively 
determined meanings of money.  I will conclude by focusing specifically on empirical 
work that has attempted to address the multiple meanings of pay explicitly: Thierry’s 
“reflective theory” of pay.  
The Meaning of Money 
Money frequently has been studied as an inducement to work. Clearly, 
practitioners and business people frequently use money as a way to reward employees for 
their performance of assigned work tasks (Milkovich & Newman, 1998; Lawler, 1987). 
However, the evidence surrounding the motivational potential of money is debatable.  
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Since the early work of Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman (1959), money has 
been thought of as extrinsically motivating, even though some have noted that his data 
suggested that pay could have both extrinsic and intrinsic features (see Thierry, 1990; 
1992). McGregor’s (1960) Theory X vs. Theory Y assumed that people perceived being 
motivated by money as different than being motivated by higher order needs (e.g., 
achievement, recognition) and would react differently. Indeed, Deci and Ryan (1985) 
have shown that providing money for performing a task decreases subsequent intrinsic 
motivation on the part of participants in the lab, a finding they contend extends to paying 
salary for completion of job tasks.  
However, more recent research has shown that money can have numerous 
meanings (i.e., Mitchell & Mickel, 1999) to individuals. For instance, it can even reflect 
information about higher order needs such as relative standing amongst peers, or even 
accomplishment. Later work by Herzberg (1966) has recognized that there may be certain 
individuals who will be motivated by hygiene factors such as money. The debate over 
money continues to this day.  
Not only do there appear to be multiple dimensions of symbolic meaning, but 
there appear to be inter-individual differences in these attributed meanings also. Little 
research has investigated how these individual differences relate to referent choice. 
Similar to equity sensitivity, the individual difference of money meanings may help lead 
to better understanding of the relationship between inequity and pay satisfaction.  The 
challenge becomes how to reconcile the multiple meanings of money with individual 
perceptions of monetary inequity. I suggest that by paying attention to these individual 
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differences in the symbolic value of money, researchers will gain understanding about 
perceptions of inequity; particularly in regards to the referent comparison process. 
Unfortunately, empirical research on compensation has shown less of a focus on 
individual differences in the meaning people attach to money (Mitchell & Mickel, 1999). 
Recently, there have been a number of different conceptualizations of how individuals 
may differentially value money and how these individual differences can be measured. 
Table 2 summarizes the different empirical and theoretical conceptualizations of the 
meaning of money. The conceptualizations most relevant to the study of inequity will be 
outlined in the following section. One important trend in this research is that most of 
these conceptualizations of multiple meanings include a scale dimension that relates to 
money as a marker of status and achievement. Money typically is said to satisfy extrinsic 
motives (Lawler, 1990), although this interpretation suggests money may also satisfy 
individual intrinsic motives.   
One of the more notable attempts to bring individual difference constructs into 
compensation research is that of Tang and his colleagues. Tang (1992) has developed the 
Money Ethic Scale (MES) to measure money related attitudes, behaviors, and cognitions 
in organizational settings. Tang (1993) has suggested that attitudes towards money may 
have a significant impact on the perception of work related tasks, reward systems, and 
intrinsic motivation. Tang (1992) developed a preliminary set of items to tap dimensions 
linking money to different individual needs, positive and negative attitudes, 
management/control, obsession, and power.  He found that the best 30 items clustered 
into six distinct factors with satisfactory internal consistency and test-retest reliability. 
The first factor, Good, referred to the idea that money is important and valuable while 
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factor 2, Evil, consisted of items that indicated negative attitudes towards money, 
including shame. Achievement referred to money as a symbol of success. The fourth 
factor, Respect, was consistent with the idea that money is associated with gaining self-
esteem and respect from the other members of the community. Budget was related to the 
retention and careful use of money (i.e., paying bills on time). The sixth factor, 
Freedom/Power, was related to seeing money as a source of autonomy, freedom, and 
security.  
Tang (1992) found that individuals with a high income tended to be more likely to 
see money as representative of achievement and less likely to see money as evil. In 
addition, different dimensions of the MES predicted different affective outcomes. 
Individuals who tended to see money as achievement also tended to have lower 
satisfaction with work, promotions, supervision, co-workers, and life in general. Those 
who saw money as freedom had low satisfaction with work, pay, co-workers, and life in 
general. Finally, those who tended to score high on the budget dimension, also tended to 
be older and have more life satisfaction.  
Tang (1993) has also suggested that the different dimensions of the MES 
represented affective (Good & Evil), behavioral (Budget), and cognitive components 
(Achievement, Respect, Freedom) and that the cognitive components are associated with 
an external locus of control. His data demonstrated that the cognitive component of 
achievement was related to external locus of control, symptoms of work related stress, 
and being male.  
Tang (1995) has more recently developed a shortened version of the MES with 12 
items by selecting the two highest loading items from the larger MES. He demonstrated 
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that the correlations between the short version and long version of each scale dimension 
were adequate to believe that researchers can confidently use the short version. Factor 
analyses indicated that the shortened scale has 3 factors: Success (included the long 
version factors of Achievement, Power, Respect, Good), Budget, and Evil. These factors 
represent cognitive, behavioral, and affective components respectively. In addition, 
individuals who tended to endorse the MES items also tended to have a low level of pay 
satisfaction.  
Other scholars have researched additional dimensions that money may represent. 
Srivastava, Locke, and Bartol (2001) have recently attempted to capture money motives 
(cognitions) as a way to explain how the importance of money (i.e., its valence) 
negatively impacts subjective well-being. Money motives were operationalized as three 
higher order factors: Positive Motives which refer to meeting needs and using money as a 
measure of market worth and achievement. Negative Motives refer to a desire to feel 
superior in social comparison, to acquire power over another individual, or to attempt to 
overcome self-doubt by showing off. Freedom of Action refers to spending money the 
way one would like to (e.g., charity, shopping, etc.). Srivastava et al. (2001) also 
measured general money importance as it relates to different uses (i.e., helping others, 
global welfare, etc.) and money aspiration (desired salary in 12 months; desired salary in 
5 years). They found that the negative relationship between money importance and 
subjective well being was mediated by Negative Motives. This conceptualization of 
Negative Motives may be especially relevant to referent related research as it 
encompasses the idea of social comparison with others.  
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Although these conceptualizations of monetary symbolism have been promising, 
the focus of the current study is on money as a means of payment in organizations. 
Thierry (2001) has asserted that his own “reflective theory” (1992; 2001) has an explicit 
focus on pay as it relates to self-identity and work behavior, a focus that is reflected in the 
measure. In contrast, the equity sensitivity does not focus on specific outcomes such as 
pay, rather it focuses on a set of indefinite outcomes. Thierry’s “reflective theory” 
focuses on the rewarding aspects that multiple meanings of money may reflect. He asserts 
that pay itself “reflects” assumptions about the employer-employee relationship and that 
it may have multiple categories of meaning. The salience of pay is hypothesized to be 
directly related to the extent that it conveys information about domains relative to the 
individual’s self-concept. As pay takes on more meanings, it may take on more 
importance to the extent that it can be a way to satisfy motives in more domains relevant 
to the self-concept. Consequently, pay is more salient to individuals who see more 
symbolic meaning in their pay. This increased salience may lead some to be more 
sensitive to the outcome that pay represents.  
Similarly, Summers and DeNisi (1990) have noted that pay valence was 
correlated with perceived inequity, such that those individuals who found pay to be more 
attractive tended to perceive more inequity. Previous work on equity sensitivity has also 
found that when asked to distribute points on the Job Descriptive Index, Entitleds (e.g., 
individuals high in equity sensitivity) placed significantly more importance on pay as a 
work characteristic (King, Miles, & Day, 1993).  These results suggest that valuing 
money may be related to judgments of equity. Thierry (2001) also explicitly suggests that 
those who see more meanings in money are more likely to value money. As a result, it 
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may be the case that equity sensitivity is a spurious moderator of the relationship between 
equity judgments and pay satisfaction. Equity sensitivity may in fact be an outcome of 
attaching more meanings to money (see Figure 4). Thus, it was hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 5: Individuals who perceive more reflected meanings of pay are more likely 
to be Entitled.  
 
Thierry (2001) has more specifically outlined four potential categories of pay 
meaning. The first is related to motivational properties. Pay reflects an instrumentality 
that allows for goal accomplishment; a vehicle that can lead to the satisfaction of certain 
needs or motives. For example, one may consider pay to be symbolic of things like status 
in society, recognition, and stability, and can be associated with the idea of “expectancy.” 
Consequently, the motivational meaning of pay is a reflection of outcomes that an 
individual is motivated to satisfy with money. As individuals high in equity sensitivity 
(e.g., Entitleds) tend to be more outcome focused (King et al., 1993; Miles et al., 1994), it 
was hypothesized that:  
Hypothesis 6: Individuals who perceive the motivational properties of pay are more likely 
to be Entitled.  
 
Pay can also signal feedback about job performance, which Thierry (1992; 2001) 
calls relative position. Relative position has two important aspects. The first is to give 
feedback about performance in relation to a certain standard or goal. Secondly, pay 
reflects feedback about performance in relation to others. On a larger scale, relative 
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position may also informs the individual about the level of appreciation that the 
organization has for their work.  
Pay also reflects the extent to which the individual has the autonomy to regulate 
themselves and others, also known as “control.” Typically, in organizations, an individual 
will be dependent not only on the manager to set goals, but also on a network of people in 
the environment who provide resources necessary to do the job. As a result, pay may 
reflect the extent to which the person is 1) able to regulate their own behavior in an 
organization and 2) alter the behavior of others in the organization towards what the 
individual wants (i.e., more valued outcomes). The idea of pay reflecting control can be 
seen in terms of both organizational hierarchy and role set. Hierarchically, job level tends 
to be related to both level of responsibility and autonomy, and as a result, salary level. 
Role is also related to hierarchy such that important roles in the organization tend to be 
commensurately compensated. As a result, pay serves as a proxy for the amount of power 
and control the individual may exert. In a similar vein, Locke (1976) has noted that 
individuals may treat their pay as a proxy for the value of the contribution that they make 
to the organization.  
As Thierry (2001) notes, the final meaning of pay, spending, is closely related to 
the first. The difference is that the motivational meaning focuses on pay as a source of 
intangible opportunities, while the spending meaning reflects concrete goods and services 
that can be purchased. Past research on equity sensitivity has found evidence that Entitled 
individuals have an intolerance for under-reward situations because they are focused on 
outcomes, the source of their satisfaction (King et al., 1993). Furthermore, Miles, 
Hatfield, and Huseman (1994) found that Entitleds tend to be more focused on extrinsic 
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rewards, such as pay. Thierry (1998; 2001) has posited that one of the meanings of pay 
(spending) is related to the satisfaction that results from being able to purchase tangible 
goods and services. As a result it was hypothesized that:  
Hypothesis 7: Individuals who perceive more meanings of pay related to spending are 
more likely to be Entitled.  
 
Thierry notes a general need for more research on pay and compensation, as 
reflective theory hypothesizes that the more reflective pay is (regarding multiple 
meanings), the more influence it has over a person’s performance and satisfaction level 
(Thierry, 1998; 2001). The converse to this proposition is that when pay is less 
meaningful to an individual, it has less of an influence on their behavior. Rice et al. 
(1991) have found that the more important the outcome, the more likely the outcome will 
be associated with a larger range of strong emotions as opposed to neutral ones. The 
current study proposed that individuals who see more reflected meanings of money will 
be more sensitive to changes in pay equity. Similar to equity sensitivity, the meaning of 
pay may be an individual difference that impacts the relationship between perceptions of 
equity and pay satisfaction (see Figure 2). Thierry (2001) has suggested the metaphor of a 
mirror to represent the individual meanings of pay. Indeed, by considering the reflected 
meanings of money in sum, the current study proposes that each meaning of money 
serves as a cognitive link sensitivity to financial issues and individual behavior. Thus, 
more reflected meanings may be associated with individual sensitivity to pay satisfaction 
scenarios. As a result, it was hypothesized that: 
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Hypothesis 8: The reflected meaning of pay will moderate the relationship between 
referent related pay differentials and pay satisfaction.  
  
Furthermore, some have proposed that money, and pay more specifically, has a 
special connotation (Furnham & Argyle, 1998; Thierry, 1998, 2001). As noted above, 
there are a number of studies that have investigated the multiple meanings of money (i.e., 
Furnham, 1984; Mitchell & Mickens, 1999; Tang, 1992). It is suggested that because pay 
can have multiple meanings and represent a number of different things to people that a 
scale focused on pay will have greater predictive utility than using unspecified outcomes. 
The MOP focuses on pay specifically, and the ESI only focuses on indefinite outcomes, 
and it may even be the case that equity sensitivity is an outcome of perceiving meanings 
of pay; therefore it is hypothesized that:  
Hypothesis 9: The reflected meaning of pay will be a stronger moderator of the 
relationship between referent related pay differentials and pay satisfaction than Equity 
Sensitivity. 
 
What the previous studies demonstrate is clear evidence for the multifaceted 
symbolic value of money. There are individuals who see money as a way to satisfy 
multiple needs in their life, both intrinsic and extrinsic (Herzberg, 1966; Mitchell & 
Mickel, 1999). It also appears that different facets tend to be predictive of different 
behaviors. One dimension that tends to consistently emerge is the idea that money is 
related to status and accomplishments on the job, which all fill higher order needs that are 
typically categorized as intrinsic. The notion that pay can also serve as a marker of 
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achievement is indicated by the relative position scale of the MOP.  Herzberg (1966) 
noted that money can serve as both a motivator and a dissatisfier. Although it was 
eventually classified as a dissatisfier, Herzberg noted that money can serve as a motivator 
because it reflects effective performance on the job in comparison to others. Lawler 
(1971) has used the metaphor of pay as a yardstick with which to measure performance. 
The relative position subscale of the MOP reflects whether pay represents feedback in 
comparison to others (Thierry, 2001). It may be that the relationship between the pay of 
others and pay satisfaction is a result of whether the individual feels that pay represents 
their performance in comparison to others. It was proposed that individuals who see 
money as symbolic of accomplishment (an intrinsic factor) have more of both their 
intrinsic and extrinsic needs met through what they receive in compensation. As a result, 
these individuals will be more likely to be focused on what they’re getting in comparison 
to others. It is expected that for these individuals, referent outcomes would relate more 
strongly to satisfaction. As a result, it was hypothesized that:  
Hypothesis 10: Perceptions of pay as a marker of relative position will moderate the 
relationship between referent related pay differentials and pay satisfaction.  
  
Finally, Ordonez, Connolly, and Coughlan (2000) have suggested that when 
individuals are presented with a number of referents, they selectively focus on a smaller 
subset. They have further suggested that the search process is impacted by individual 
differences. As a result, the current study posited that certain individual differences 
related to the meaning of pay covary with the selection of certain referents.  
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Thierry (2001) has suggested that money can represent a proxy for the level of 
control an individual has in an organization. I suggest that level of control in an 
organization is most likely to be related to comparisons against others within the same 
organization. As a result, it was hypothesized that:  
Hypothesis 11: Individuals who perceive more meanings of pay related to control are 
more likely to focus on the Internal referent group.   
 
Thierry (2001) has also suggested that money can represent a proxy for 
performance not only relative to organizational goals, but also relevant to others in the 
organization, signaling relative position. I suggest that relative position is also most likely 
to be related to comparisons against others within the same organization. As a result, it 
was hypothesized that:  
Hypothesis 12: Individuals who perceive more meanings of pay related to relative 
position are more likely to focus on the Internal referent group. 
 
 The third symbolic meaning of pay is motivational properties (Thierry, 2001). 
This represents the achievement of life goals and accomplishments using money. I 
suggest that life goals and accomplishments are most likely to be compared with 
individuals outside the organization and in their social network (similar education and 
experience). As a result, it was hypothesized that:  
Hypothesis 13: Individuals who perceive more meanings of pay related to motivational 
properties are least likely to focus on the External referent group. 
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Study 1 – Substantive Validity Assessment of Meaning of Pay Instrument 
 There exists a fair amount of published empirical research to support the construct 
validity of the Equity Sensitivity Instrument (i.e., Miles, Hatfield, & Huseman, 1994; 
Allen & White, 2002; Patrick & Jackson, 1991), however less evidence exists on the 
reliability and validity of the meaning of pay (MOP) instrument. As a result, the goals of 
Study 1 were twofold. First, to generate additional items to fully cover the four construct 
domains specified by Thierry (2001) in his writings on the reflected meanings of pay, and 
second, to empirically establish additional construct validity evidence for the MOP.  
 Thierry (2001; 1998) has suggested that the meanings of pay reflect needs that are 
salient to different individuals and connected to self-identity. Thus, in Study 1 an explicit 
attempt was made to map the reflected meanings onto an empirically established 
taxonomy of human needs. Sheldon, Elliott, Kim and Kasser (2001) have demonstrated 
empirical evidence that individual needs can include competence, autonomy, popularity-
influence, and money-luxury. Sheldon et al. (2001) developed these definitions of 
competence and autonomy based on the self-determination theory of motivation (Deci 
and Ryan, 1985), which suggests that people want to feel that they are effective in their 
daily life (competence) and that people want to feel that they have the freedom to choose, 
as opposed to being externally determined (autonomy). Furthermore, Sheldon et al. 
(2001) used a to some extent intuitive theory of human needs, the “American dream” of 
winning friends and influencing people (Carnegie, 1936). This theory suggests that 
people are more satisfied when they are able to acquire popularity-influence and money-
luxury items (Derber, 1979).   
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These four needs appear to map onto the MOP factors of motivational properties 
(popularity-influence), relative position (competence), control (autonomy), and spending 
(money-luxury), respectively. Sheldon et al. (2001)’s construct definitions were then used 
to aid in the generation of additional items. An attempt was made to have eight items 
represent each dimension of the MOP, a number which allows for items to be dropped 
while still having the minimum 4-6 items per scale recommended by Hinkin (1998). 
Further, Harvey, Billings, and Nilan (1985) have suggested a minimum of 4 items per 
scale and that it is difficult to improve the internal consistency of a scale with 5 well 
constructed items (Hinkin, 1985; Hinkin & Schriesheim, 1989; Schriesheim & Hinkin, 
1990). All 32 items are listed in Table 3. New items generated by the author are marked 
with an asterisk.  
 The current study used a substantive validity assessment to support the construct 
validity of the MOP items. A substantive validity assessment differs from a Q-sort in the 
calculation of indices that indicate a given item’s potential construct validity during a 
confirmatory factor analysis (Anderson & Gerbing, 1991). Anderson and Gerbing (1991) 
have recommended the method of substantive validity assessment for situations in which 
it is difficult to gain access to the large samples needed for empirical evidence of 
construct validity (i. e., confirmatory factor analysis). The method involves using judges 
who are similar to those in the sample of interest. Judges are given definitions of each of 
the constructs in everyday terms and asked to assign each item to the construct 
represented. Two indices can be calculated, the proportion of substantive agreement, psa, 
and the substantive validity coefficient, csv. The proportion of substantive agreement is 
the proportion of respondents that assign an item to its intended construct, while the 
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substantive validity coefficient is a more conservative index, as it indicates the extent to 
which respondents assign an item to the intended construct as compared to other options. 
The calculation of these indices are indicated by the equations psa = nc/N, and csv = (nc – 
no)/N, where nc represents the number of respondents that assign an item to the correct 
construct, N represents the total number of respondents, and no represents the highest 
number of assignments to any other potential construct. It is suggested that larger, 
positive values of both of these indices indicate higher construct validity and are best 
used comparatively, such that the items to be retained are those with larger values on 
these indices.  
A substantive validity assessment appears to be an appropriate way of assessing 
the construct validity of an item. Anderson and Gerbing (1991) have empirically 
demonstrated that the results from a substantive validity assessment significantly 
predicted the performance of individual items in an assessment of its construct validity 
(e.g., factor loadings in a confirmatory factor analysis), differentiating items with high 
construct validity from those with low construct validity. 
Method 
Participants 
 The judges for the substantive validity analysis were recruited from a pool of 
current and recent (i.e., graduated within two years) masters level business students using 
the snowball technique. The snowball technique is a form of non-probability sampling 
asks individuals enlisting other members of the target population to participate in the 
study (Hoyle, Harris, & Judd, 2002). Consistent with Anderson and Gerbing’s (1991) 
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recommendations, fourteen judges who fit the criteria and were not currently enrolled at 
the site of the main study participated in the task.  
Procedure 
Construction of Item Sort Task. An item-sort task was generated by randomly 
ordering the 32 items, following each item was a blank line for the participant to indicate 
construct assignment. A construct label and a short one sentence definition of each 
construct were placed adjacent to the items. The construct definitions given to 
participants are listed in Appendix C. Participants were instructed to indicate the 
construct represented by each item. Participants completed the task in roughly 5-10 
minutes and emailed it back to the first author.   
Measures 
 Participants evaluated items that included the 24 items from the MOP (Thierry, 
2001; Shaw, 1996) and 8 new items generated by the first author (see Table 3).  
Results 
The two main indices of interest, the proportion of substantive agreement and the 
substantive validity coefficients for all items are also presented in Table 3. Most items 
have substantial agreement (i.e., indices above .70), however some items have negative 
substantive validity coefficients, which indicates questionable construct validity.    
Discussion 
 Based on Anderson and Gerbing’s (1991) recommendations, .70 was used as the 
predetermined cutoff on both indices for an item to be accepted for inclusion. Based on 
this decision rule, the results suggest that items 1, 4, 6, 7, 10, 19, 21, 23, 26 should be 
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removed from the scales as they may have limited construct validity. It is also important 
to note that of these 9 items, the relative position and spending scales each had only one 
deleted item. The motivational dimension had four deleted while the control dimension 
had three. This may suggest that the relative position and spending dimensions are in 
general perceived more concretely by participants.  
 
Study 2 – Policy Capturing 
 The pool of refined items from study 1 was then used to represent the meaning of 
pay constructs to be tested in study 2. The purpose of study 2 was to test the main 
hypotheses presented in the introduction, using the policy capturing approach 
recommended by Law and Wong (1998).  
Method 
Participants 
 The participants included 145 master’s level business students from a large public 
mid-Atlantic University. The majority of participants were male (66.9%). Fifty-seven 
percent indicated that their race was Caucasian, 33% Asian, 5% Black, 4% Hispanic, and 
1% indicated Other. Forty-two percent indicated that their nationality was International. 
The mean age of participants was 28.5 (SD = 3.10). Most participants indicated they were 
not currently employed (81.4%), however 9% indicated they were employed full-time 
and 9% were currently employed part-time.  
Measures 
Meanings of Pay 
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The meaning of pay (MOP) is based on Thierry’s reflection theory of pay 
(Thierry 1998; 2001) which holds that the meaning of pay is determined by the extent to 
which pay “reflects” four separate domains. These factors have been labeled: 1) 
motivational properties, 2) relative position, 3) control, and 4) spending. These factors 
will be verified in the present study using confirmatory factor analysis, an analytic 
procedure that can be used to determine the clustering of hypothesized variables 
(Nunnally & Bernstein, 1967).  The current scale includes 24 items from the original 
MOP and 8 additional items designed by the first author. The items are all scored on a 5 
point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree. Scale items and instructions as 
given to participants appear in Appendix D.  
The internal consistency of all the final sub-dimensions of the MOP was above 
.70, which is considered adequate. The reliability of the scales were motivation (α = .81), 
relative position (α = .87), control (α = .71), and spending (α = .89).   
Equity Sensitivity Instrument
Equity Sensitivity was measured using Huseman et al.’s (1985) Equity Sensitivity 
Instrument (ESI), a five item forced distribution scale developed to elicit an individual’s 
preferences for outcomes versus inputs in general work situations. To score the 
instrument, for each item, two statements are presented: one that presents an Entitled 
response, the other is a Benevolent response. Participants indicate their agreement with 
each statement by distributing 10 points between the Entitled and Benevolent statements. 
The ESI score is gathered by summing the points allocated to the Benevolent responses. 
A copy of the scale as presented to participants can be found in Appendix E. In the 
current study, the reliability of the ESI was α = .69. 
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Pay Satisfaction
Pay satisfaction will be measured using the 2 item pay satisfaction subscale of 
Hackman and Oldham’s (1974) Job Diagnostic Survey. The JDS has been found to have 
satisfactory psychometric characteristics (Burke, 1999; Hackman & Oldham, 1975). The 
JDS uses a Likert response format with anchors from Extremely Dissatisfied to 
Extremely Satisfied. The items are featured in Appendix F as part of the experimental 
stimulus. The coefficient alpha for the scale in the current study was α = .95.   
 Organizational Attractiveness 
 A single item was used to measure the attractiveness of the organization’s salary 
offer, i.e., “Based on this scenario, how likely are you to accept a job with this 
organization?” The response format was a 7 item scale from Extremely Unlikely to 
Extremely Likely.  
 Future Referent 
 A single free response item was used to measure future individual salary 
expectations with the question “What salary do you expect upon graduation?” 
Design 
This approach used in the current study is similar to the policy capturing approach 
of Law and Wong (1998). In this approach, participants are placed into a number of 
hypothetical but realistic scenarios. The policy capturing approach has been used 
previously in compensation (e.g., Sherer, Schwab, & Heneman, 1987) as an effective way 
to assess the judgments of how individuals weight different pieces of information 
relevant to compensation. Furthermore, an advantage of the policy capturing approach as 
compared to self-report is that the policy capturing approach can purportedly attenuate 
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social desirability effects by indirectly inferring the importance of certain attributes from 
participant preferences (Arnold & Feldman, 1981; Judge & Bretz, 1992). The policy 
capturing approach also allows for the ability to experimentally manipulate the values of 
certain attributes and also minimize multicollinearity among independent variables 
(Karren & Barringer, 2002).  
Fractional Factorial Design 
If a completely crossed experimental design were employed there would be 4 
factors free to vary: the salary of the participant along with the salary of the three target 
referent groups. Given that the level of pay varies between low, medium, and high, this 
would create 3 X 3 X 3 X 3 conditions, requiring participants to read and respond to a 
total of 81 scenarios. However, Kirk (1968) has suggested the fractional factorial design 
as an alternative design that can reduce the number of treatment conditions participants 
are exposed to. Although this reduction in treatment conditions requires the assumption 
that higher order interactions are small or negligible relative to main effects, the 
fractional factorial design has been deemed appropriate for research where main effects 
of are more importance than higher order interactions (Connor & Zelen, 1959; Kirk, 
1968).  Graham and Cable (1991) have compared the results from a full and fractional 
factorial design and found that the fractional factorial design is a valid alternative that 
gave similar results while at the same time minimizing participant fatigue.  
As a result, the current experiment will employ a one-third fractional factorial 
design (CRFF-34-1) such that each participant is only exposed to 27 possible scenarios. As 
suggested by Kirk (1968), the number of treatment combinations can be reduced by 
systematically limiting which treatment combinations participants are exposed to. The 
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downside of this design is that the treatment-interaction confounding purposely 
confounds main effects with higher order interactions that are expected to be relatively 
small (Kirk, 1968).  
Kirk has also recommended the tables of Connor and Zelen (1959) tables to 
determine the design of treatment combinations to be included in the experiment. The 
treatment (factor) combinations used in the current experiment (as adapted from Connor 
& Zelen) are presented in Appendix G. In this design, the highest order interaction 
(ABCD) is used as the defining contrast, and thus only the effects of A, B, C, D, AB2, 
AC2, AD2, BC2, BD2, and CD2 are considered measurable (Connor & Zelen, 1959). The 
three way interactions and two way interactions not listed are aliased with other effects 
and therefore are not considered measurable.  
However, analyzing the data using these four predictors revealed that most of the 
variance in pay satisfaction was due to salary alone. Since perceptions of equity are based 
on differences between the person and the referent (Adams, 1965), the predictors were 
calculated by subtracting the difference between the person’s salary and that of each of 
the three referents, which created 3 factors and a more parsimonious model. As a result, 
difference scores were used as the predictors of equity for all analyses.  
Stimuli Development 
The experimental manipulation in the current study varied the amount of money 
being paid to not only the participant, but also varied the salary of three target referent 
groups (i.e., internal, external, and educational referents). Inequity was thereby induced 
by manipulating these four variables to create pay differentials between referent groups. 
In order to increase psychological fidelity, the manipulation employed realistic figures 
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that reflected actual market values, thus the hypothetical pay level of the participants and 
their referents were generated based on employment survey data from the site of the 
study with M = $6237 per month, SD = $1170 per month (R.H. Smith School of Business 
2004 Employment Statistics, n.d.).  
The current study used a within-subjects design featuring four factors: salary of 
the participant, along with the salary of three specific referent groups: 1) others inside the 
organization (inside referent), 2) others outside the organization (outside referent), and 3) 
others with similar education and experience (educational referent). Aiman-Smith et al. 
(2002) have suggested that in policy capturing research of this nature, it is typical to 
choose three levels for each factor that represent the mean, and one standard deviation 
both above and below the mean. Thus, the pay used for each factor in the experimental 
manipulation varies between three levels that can be considered low ($5067/month), 
medium ($6237/month), or high ($7407/month). 
Excepting salary levels, all other features of the different scenarios were held 
constant. In each scenario, the participant is provided with the hypothetical pay levels of 
not only themselves, but with the pay of the three selected referent groups. The 
participants are asked how satisfied they would be if given stated values of their pay and 
of the pay for each of the three referent groups. For a sample scenario, also see Appendix 
F.  
Participants’ responses were measured by a seven-point, Likert-type scale ranging 
from extremely satisfied (1) to extremely dissatisfied (7). A choice of ‘I don’t know’ was 
provided at the midpoint of the scale (see Appendix F).  
Pilot Study 
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A pilot study was conducted to determine whether the manipulated cue values 
generated the desired perceptions of low, medium, and high pay values. A sample of 19 
participants were presented with the full set of experimental scenarios that included 
survey items to check if the participants perceived differences in equity between the low, 
medium, and high values of each cue. The t tests for each referent group demonstrated 
statistically significant differences between the low, medium, and high levels of each cue. 
The first step of the data analysis was to calculate equity variables for each referent group 
which represented five potential salary differentials of -2, -1, 0, 1, 2 standard deviations 
about the mean. A one way ANOVA was conducted where the aforementioned five 
equity differentials represented the independent variable and the referent related survey 
item was the DV.  For the internal equity manipulation, this F test was significant F (4, 
505) = 318.10, p < .001. Post hoc Bonferroni t-tests indicated a significant difference 
between all scenarios. For the external equity manipulation, the F test was once again 
significant, F (4, 505) = 229.82, p < .001. Post hoc Bonferroni t-tests once again 
indicated a significant difference between all cue levels. Finally, the F test for 
educational equity was manipulation was significant, F (4, 506) = 306.11, p < .001. Post 
hoc Bonferroni t-tests were significant between all cue levels. These results suggest that 
participants did notice the manipulated differences between salary cue values and that it 
was appropriate to conceptualize these differences as differences in equity.  
Procedure 
The participants were recruited from a master’s level business course and asked to 
optionally participate in research as part of a class exercise. During time 1, participants 
indicated a unique tracking code and completed the ESI and MOP measures.  
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In order to control for context effects, the experimental scenarios were given out 
during Time 2 a week later. The scenarios present the participants with a number of 
hypothetical situations that represent different salary offers for a job as an “associate.” 
The cover letter stated that the purpose of the current study was to examine individuals’ 
attitudes about pay and reactions to salary offers. Participants then completed their 
responses to the 27 different scenarios. Two additional scenarios were also repeated in 
order to assess within-person consistency, for a total of 29 scenarios. 
In order to control for order effects, the order of the scenarios was 
counterbalanced randomly across participants. Following completion of the experimental 
scenarios, the participants were asked to fill out selected demographic information and to 
indicate their unique identifier code. 
Analyses 
The data was analyzed with hierarchical linear modeling (HLM; Bryk & 
Raudenbush, 1992). This technique has been suggested as appropriate for policy 
capturing data because it allows researchers to examine both within and between person 
variance (Mellor, Paley, & Holzworth, 1999; Morrison & Vancouver, 2000).  
In the Level 1 (within-subject) analysis, regression equations were calculated for 
each individual in which pay satisfaction was regressed on internal, external, and 
educational referent cues (including both main effects and higher order interactions).   
The Level 2 (between-subject) analysis used a restricted maximum likelihood 
approach in which the intercept and slope parameters from the Level 1 model were 
regressed onto Level 2 predictors (e.g., person level variables such as the meaning of 
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pay). This set of analyses allows for tests of intercept and slope differences based on level 
2 variables.  
In addition, multiple regression/correlation (MRC) was used to test the 
relationships between the Level 2 (between subject) variables. MRC is a powerful 
analytic tool that can be used to study associations where one variable is a function of 
another variable (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). MRC also yields measures of effect size that 
reflect the magnitude of relationships between hypothesized factors and variables.  
Results 
Manipulation Check  
 The first step of the data analysis was to once again ensure that the study 
participants truly perceived the differences between scenarios which represented different 
equity differentials. A one way ANOVA was conducted where the equity differentials 
represented the independent variable and the referent related manipulation check was the 
DV.  For the internal equity manipulation, this F test was significant F (4, 2872) = 
1048.48, p < .001. Post hoc Bonferroni t-tests indicated a significant difference between 
all scenarios. For the external equity manipulation, the F test was once again significant, 
F (4, 2877) = 950.80, p < .001. Post hoc Bonferroni t-tests once again indicated a 
significant difference between all cue levels. Finally, the F test for educational equity was 
manipulation was significant, F (4, 2880) = 1073.52, p < .001. Post hoc Bonferroni t-tests 
were significant between all cue levels. These results suggest that participants did notice 
the manipulated differences between salary cue values and that it was appropriate to 
conceptualize these differences as differences in equity.   
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Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
Based on the substantive validity assessment of Study 1, 9 MOP items appeared 
to have limited construct validity. These items were included in the survey, as many of 
these items were part of Thierry’s original MOP scale. However these items were 
dropped during the confirmatory factor analysis. The initial factor analysis had a 
moderate fit, χ2 = 435.58 (df = 224), p < .001, with a CFI = .83 and a RMSEA = .089. 
Item factor loadings are featured in Table 4.  However this analysis also indicated that 
items 2, 15, 17, 18, and 28 had factor loadings below .6, thus these items were dropped 
and the factor analysis was run again. The refined model had much better fit, χ2 = 194.64 
(df = 129), p < .001, with CFI = .93 and RMSEA = .065.  The correlations between the 
subscales of the MOP were low to moderate (ranging from r = .03 to r = .47). As a 
result, this refined model was used to calculate the final scales.  
Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for within person and between person 
measures are reported in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. Given the high correlation between 
the pay satisfaction and organizational attractiveness measures, the latter was dropped 
form all future analyses.  
Unconditional Means Model (One-way ANOVA) 
 The unconditional means model, alternatively known as a one-way analysis of 
variance, is a model which specifies no predictors, thus the model only estimates an 
intercept for each individual. This allows the researcher to specify a baseline amount of 
within and between person variance that can be explained (Level 1 and Level 2 variances 
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respectively; Hofmann, 1997; Singer, 1998). In order to do this, a one way ANOVA was 
conducted using pay satisfaction as the dependent variable.  
 The model estimated the within person variance σ2 = 2.90 and the between person 
variance τ00 = .18. This yielded an intra-class correlation (ICC) value of .057, which 
suggests that most of the variation of the dependent variable is within-person.  
Level 1 (Within-Person) Analyses 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that referent related pay differentials (internal, external, 
and educational equity) would be related to pay satisfaction. In order to test this 
hypothesis, both the main effects and higher order interactions of these differentials were 
used as predictors of pay satisfaction using the maximum likelihood function in HLM. 
Initially, only main effects were modeled in the first step. The main effects accounted for 
69% of the within-person variance in pay satisfaction. Next, the two way interactions 
were entered, which explained an additional 0.62% of the within-person variance in pay 
satisfaction. Finally, the 3 way interactions added an additional 1.34% of the within-
person variance in pay satisfaction. In sum, this suggests that despite the presence of 
significant higher order interactions, most of the within person variance is accounted for 
by the main effects.  
The parameter estimates for the average intercepts and slopes across participants 
are also reported in Table 7. A significant main effect for all three forms of equity was 
found. Further, there was a significant External X Educational two-way interaction and a 
significant three way interaction (see Figures 5 and 6). These coefficients all differ 
significantly from zero and thus provide support for Hypothesis 1. Pay satisfaction is 
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affected by the relative standing of one’s salary compared to the salary of all three 
referent groups.  
For ease of interpretation, the three way interaction has been plotted with separate 
figures for conditions of negative (i.e., unfavorable for participant) internal equity (Figure 
5) and conditions of positive (favorable for participant) internal equity (Figure 6), 
respectively. Considering the condition of negative internal equity first (Figure 5), pay 
satisfaction is the lowest when external and educational referents receive more money. 
However, as pay becomes more favorable with regard to educational referents, pay 
satisfaction increases steeply. What is especially surprising about the interaction shown in 
Figure 5 is that when salary relative to internal referents is low and salary relative to 
external referents is high, pay satisfaction actually decreases as salary relative to the 
educational referent increases, even though equity theory would predict the opposite.  
Turning to Figure 6, which features positive internal equity, the most striking 
thing is the similarity between the two conditions on the left, which represent positive 
internal equity and low educational equity. When these two conditions are in place, it 
appears that the external referent becomes insignificant. In addition, by examining the 
darker line, it appears that when there is positive internal and negative external equity 
that gains in educational equity (from negative to positive) do little to improve pay 
satisfaction. In fact, the slope of this line is close to flat and slightly negative. Finally, the 
shaded line suggests that when both internal and external equity are positive, as 
educational equity rises, there is a significant gain in pay satisfaction.  
 Hypothesis 2 predicted that equity would be more strongly related to pay 
satisfaction than would actual salary level. A series of statistical analyses were conducted 
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to test this hypothesis.  First, the amount of variance explained by a model using actual 
salary level as the only predictor of pay satisfaction was compared to the amount of 
variance explained by a model using the equity variables as the predictor of pay 
satisfaction. The model consisting of actual salary accounted for 60% of the within 
person variance in pay satisfaction whereas the model consisting of the equity predictors 
accounted for 71% of the within person variance in pay satisfaction.  This finding is 
consistent with Hypothesis 2.  
Next, I compared the fit of a model using objective predictors of salary (i.e., 
manipulated cue values) against the fit of a model that used subjective perceptions of 
referent related equity using Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC).  The AIC is a 
quantitative fit index that allows a comparison of fit for non-nested models.   The AIC 
statistic is smaller for the better fitting model (Singer, 1992).  The model using objective 
predictors of salary had an AIC of 8430.4 whereas the subjective equity model had an 
AIC of 5816.4. Once again, there is support for Hypothesis 2 that an equity 
conceptualization explained more variance in pay satisfaction better than salary.  
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the internal referent group would be the strongest 
predictor of pay satisfaction. To begin with, the dependent variable was standardized 
within-person. This serves to remove the influence of the individual respondent. 
Although Hotelling’s t-test has been the traditional test for significant differences 
between correlated coefficients (Hotelling, 1940), more recently Meng, Rosenthal, and 
Rubin (1992) have updated the formula for such computations. Thus, the relative strength 
of each referent group was tested using a statistical test which yields a Z score that 
represents the difference between the internal referent predictor and the other two 
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predictors. This Z was significant, Z = -7.15, p < .01. This suggests that the internal 
referent is a stronger predictor of pay satisfaction than either of the other two referent 
groups.  Hence, Hypothesis 3 was supported.  
Level 2 (Between Person) Analyses 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that equity sensitivity would be negatively associated with 
the number of reflected meanings of pay. To test this hypothesis, I added the number of 
reflected meanings of pay across the MOP dimensions. The correlation between equity 
sensitivity and the summed MOP score was r = -.18, p = .07, which trended toward 
significance.  In other words, participants that were more equity sensitive (i.e., Entitled) 
tend to report more reflected meanings of pay than did less equity sensitive (i.e., 
Benevolent) participants. Thus, there was weak support for Hypothesis 5.  
 Hypothesis 6 predicted a negative relationship between equity sensitivity and the 
motivational MOP dimension. The correlation between equity sensitivity and the 
motivational dimension was r = -.28, p < .01.  Participants that were more equity 
sensitive (i.e., entitled) tend to endorse more motivational meanings of pay. Thus, 
Hypothesis 6 was supported.  
 Hypothesis 7 predicted a negative relationship between equity sensitivity and the 
spending dimension of the MOP. The correlation between equity sensitivity and the 
spending dimension was r = -.22, p < .05.  Participants that were more equity sensitive 
(entitled) tended to endorse more of the spending reflected meanings of pay. Thus, 
Hypothesis 7 was supported.  
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Cross-Level Analyses 
 As reported previously, the majority of variance in pay satisfaction occurred 
within people (i.e., only 5.7% of the variance occurred between people).  The random 
coefficient modeling analysis also suggested that the slopes and intercepts for the two-
way and three-way interactions showed no significant variance across individuals.  Thus, 
I set these coefficients as fixed effects for all subsequent analyses.  
Hypothesis 4 predicted that equity sensitivity would moderate the relationship 
between the equity predictors and pay satisfaction. To test this hypothesis, I used equity 
sensitivity to predict the slope and intercept of the equity predictors to pay satisfaction. 
The results for this analysis are shown in Table 8.  As can be seen from this table, equity 
sensitivity was significantly related to only the slope of pay satisfaction and external 
equity (γ  = -.008, 21 p < .01).  This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 4 that individuals 
lower in equity sensitivity (i.e., those who are more entitled) tend to be more sensitive to 
the pay of their external colleagues. As equity sensitivity increases, the strength of the 
relationship between external equity and pay satisfaction increases.  
Equity sensitivity failed to moderate any of the other equity-pay satisfaction 
relationships. It should be noted, however, that even though equity sensitivity was not a 
significant moderator of these other equity-pay satisfaction relationships, there was a 
significant amount of variance in the slopes of the internal and educational equity-pay 
slopes across individuals.  This indicates that other unidentified variables moderate these 
relationships.  In summary, Hypothesis 4 was only partially supported. 
Hypothesis 8 predicted that the number of reflected meanings of pay would 
moderate the relationship between the different forms of equity and pay satisfaction. To 
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test this hypothesis, the composite reflected meaning of pay measure was used as a 
predictor of the equity-pay satisfaction slopes.  These results appear in Table 9. 
Unfortunately, this composite measure was not related to any of the equity-pay 
satisfaction slopes at the traditional 0.05 level of significance. However, there was a trend 
in the predicted direction for the external referent equity variable, t (104) = 1.82, p < .10.  
This result suggests that those who have more meanings in pay are more sensitive to the 
equity of their pay in relation to external others.  In summary, Hypothesis 8 was not 
supported  
Hypothesis 9 predicted that the number of reflected meanings of pay would be a 
stronger moderator of cross level relationships than would equity sensitivity. However, 
because the meaning of pay failed to moderate any of the equity-pay satisfaction 
relationships, Hypothesis 9 was not supported. In fact, it appears to be just the opposite.  
Equity sensitivity is a stronger moderator of the equity-pay satisfaction relationships than 
the meaning of pay construct.  
Hypothesis 10 predicted that the relative position dimension of the meaning of 
pay would moderate the relationships between pay differentials (equity) and pay 
satisfaction. To test this hypothesis, I used only the relative position meaning of pay 
dimension to predict the equity-pay satisfaction slopes.  The results of this analysis are in 
Table 10. Unfortunately, this dimension of meaning of pay failed to predict any of the 
equity-pay satisfaction slopes. Thus, Hypothesis 10 was not supported.  
Hypothesis 11 predicted that the control dimension of the meaning of pay would 
moderate the relationship between internal equity and pay satisfaction. Consistent with 
this hypothesis, a trend was found for this moderation hypothesis (γ  = .080, 11 p < .10), see 
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Table 11. Individuals who believe money reflects control exhibit a stronger relationship 
between the pay of internal others and pay satisfaction. These individuals also exhibit a 
stronger relationship between external equity and their pay satisfaction. Thus, there was 
limited support for Hypothesis 11.  
Hypothesis 12 predicted that the dimension of relative position meaning of pay 
would moderate the internal referent equity-pay satisfaction relationship more strongly 
than any other equity-pay satisfaction relationship. This hypothesis was not supported 
because the relative position meaning of pay variable did not significantly moderate any 
of the equity-pay satisfaction slopes.   
Hypothesis 13 predicted that the motivational meaning of pay dimension would 
be a stronger moderator of the external referent equity-pay satisfaction relationship 
compared to any other equity-pay satisfaction relationship.  The results of this analysis 
are shown in Table 12. Unfortunately, since the motivational meaning of pay did not 
significantly moderate the external referent equity-pay satisfaction relationship, 
Hypothesis 13 was not supported. Motivational properties failed to predict any of the 
equity-pay satisfaction slopes. 
Post Hoc Analyses 
It was predicted in Hypothesis 11 that the control meaning of pay dimension 
would moderate the internal equity-pay satisfaction relationship. Although there was a 
trend in the predicted direction, the effect was not significant at the traditional .05 level. I 
conducted a post hoc analysis using the control dimension to determine if it moderated 
any of the other equity-pay satisfaction relationships. As seen in Table 11, there was a 
significant moderation effect for the external equity-pay satisfaction relationship (γ  = 21
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.076, p < .05). In other words, individuals that perceive pay as control are more sensitive 
to external equity.  
A second post-hoc analysis was conducted to determine if the spending dimension 
of the meaning of pay moderated any of the equity-pay satisfaction relationships.  One 
significant effect was found.  In particular, the spending meaning of pay dimension 
moderated the external equity – pay satisfaction slope (γ21 = .066, p < .05).  Individuals 
that perceive pay as the ability to spend were more sensitive to external equity issues. 
I ran a third post-hoc analysis to determine if future salary expectations might 
moderate any of the equity-pay satisfaction relationships.  Even though I did not have any 
hypotheses regarding future salary expectations, it is possible that these expectations may 
constitute a future-self referent which impacts attitudes and behavior. It may be that 
individuals who set high salary expectations on themselves may also be more sensitive to 
the pay of others.  To test this post hoc hypothesis, a model was created that used the 
future expected salary as a predictor of the pay satisfaction intercepts and equity-pay 
satisfaction slopes. Future expected salary significantly predicted the pay satisfaction 
intercept (γ01 = -.000015, p < .01). Individuals who have higher future salary expectations 
also reported lower average pay satisfaction. Unfortunately, I was unable to test the 
future referent in the context of other moderating variables since missing data (non-
respondents) resulted in a significant loss of power for analyses with this variable.  
 A final post-hoc model was created in which all of the significant moderators of 
equity-pay satisfaction slopes were included as predictors. Specifically, I used equity 
sensitivity, the control meaning of pay, and the spending meaning of pay as predictors of 
the external equity-pay satisfaction slope. Nevertheless, when all three variables were 
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simultaneously tested, the spending dimension emerged as no longer significant. As a 
result, a final model featuring only equity sensitivity and the control meaning were 
modeled as significant predictors of the external equity – pay satisfaction slope.  The 
results are shown in Table 13.  As can be seen from this table, the equity sensitivity and 
control meaning of pay were the significant predictors of the external equity-pay 
satisfaction slope, (i.e., γ21 = -.01, p < .05; γ22 = .07, p < .05, respectively).  
Discussion 
The initial goal of the current study was to investigate the relative importance of 
three different referent groups. The pattern of results suggested that while equity 
associated with referent groups was related to pay satisfaction, the internal referent group 
emerged as the strongest driver of pay satisfaction. Secondly, the current study sought to 
explore individual differences in sensitivity to equity. There was a significant amount of 
individual variation in the strength of the relationships between pay satisfaction and the 
three referent groups, which suggests the possibility of one or more possible moderators. 
Indeed, equity sensitivity and the spending and control meanings of pay were found to 
moderate the relationship with the external referent group. These results are especially 
compelling because they suggest that pay satisfaction can be determined by both features 
of the situation (i.e., the salaries of the target and others) and by features unique to the 
individual (i.e., equity sensitivity). However the current study found that the features 
associated with the situation had much stronger effects.  
Indeed, equity still does matter to individuals, and salary information of 
themselves and others appears to drive judgments of equity. While pay satisfaction could 
be reliably predicted using salary alone, the current study found evidence that more 
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variance in satisfaction was predicted by also taking into account the salary of the three 
referent groups used in this study (internal, external, educational). These findings are 
consistent with previous studies that have found that such salary differences (Adams, 
1965; Law & Wong, 1998) are related to perceptions of equity and pay satisfaction. In 
addition, organizational attractiveness was found to be significantly associated with pay 
satisfaction. This makes these results practically important to organizations, as 
organizational attractiveness is an outcome frequently associated with the decision to 
enter or exit an organization (Sweeney & McFarlin, 2004).  
Level 1 Analyses 
The majority of the within person variance in pay satisfaction was explained by 
the main effects of the three referent groups: internal, external, and educational. This is 
consistent with previous research that has found support for these referent groups 
(Sweeney & McFarlin, 2005, 2004; Shore, 2004; Scholl et al., 1987; Law & Wong, 
1998). Although the higher order interactions in the current study are not as robustly 
supported in the extant literature (Sweeney & McFarlin, 2005), the ability to detect these 
interactions may have been due to the statistical power of the within-subjects design 
(Kirk, 1968).  
The current study also suggested that although all referent groups were important, 
the internal referent group showed the strongest relationship with pay satisfaction. The 
relative importance of these referent groups appears to be consistent with the theoretical 
framework of referent selection proposed initially by Goodman (1974) and more recently 
by Kulik and Ambrose (1992). They have both suggested that referent selection is guided 
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by referent relevance and information availability. This would suggest that the three 
aforementioned referents emerge as salient for different reasons.  
The internal referent may influence pay satisfaction in part because information 
about the internal referent is likely to be the most easily available. Individuals interact 
and form social networks, both formal and informal, with internal referents in the 
workplace (Kilduff & Tsai, 1993) and as a result, information about these internal 
referents may be easily available. As a result of these networks, individuals may have the 
opportunity to compare information about not only outputs such as salary but inputs such 
as effort on the job. For example, information about relative inputs may be more 
accessible given the “taboos” that may sometimes surround discussions about pay and 
money (Furnham, 1998). Given that individuals tend to have higher perceptions of their 
own job performance (Atwater, 1998), it also seems logical to assume this would lead to 
higher perceptions of their own relative inputs, a judgment process that can impact the 
perceived ratio of input/outputs.   
Consequently, not only is there a substantial amount of information available 
about the internal referent, but internal referents may also be seen as relevant because 
they are perceived as similar others based on having a similar employer and job title. 
Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) suggests that people prefer to compare 
themselves with similar others, and this perceived similarity of the internal referent may 
increase this group’s relevance. Moreover, internal referents may be increasingly relevant 
because information about these referents may communicate information about an 
individual’s status within the organization. Consequently, the internal referent group may 
be the most important because the internal referent satisfies needs of both information 
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availability and referent relevance, whereas the other referent groups may not necessarily 
satisfy both of these needs. Consistent with this reasoning, the coefficients associated 
with the internal referent were not only the largest, but were significantly larger than 
those associated with the main effects or interactions between the other referents. 
The information about the inputs and outputs of external referents may be limited 
due to the decreased frequency of contacts within the individual’s social networks. The 
external referent may even be perceived as less important than the internal referent due to 
a perceived lack of similarity between the individual and external others. However this 
referent may still have relevancy because information about the external referent 
communicates information about potential job opportunities elsewhere (i.e., market worth 
comparisons) or the standing of the organization amongst its peers as an employer of 
choice.  Others (e.g., Sweeney & McFarlin, 2005; Sherer, 1990) have suggested that 
external comparisons are relevant because pay level serves as a marker of status in 
society. Making such an evaluation of relative status would necessitate a broader search 
for referents outside the organization.  
Similar to the external referent, information about the educational referent may 
not be as readily available as compared to the internal referent group. Once again, 
differences in organization, job title, and job requirements may serve to increase the 
dissimilarity of the educational referent. However, the educational referent may be an 
important referent for reasons connected to referent relevance. The acquisition of a 
degree may create expectations about what constitutes an appropriate level of 
compensation, and these expectations are likely similar to those within the educational 
referent group. Equally important, knowledge level is typically one of the factors that 
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organizations use to dictate the compensation levels of employees (Milkovich & 
Newman, 1996). Previous research examining the educational referent has suggested that 
individuals at the early stages of their career tend to use their educational cohort as a 
social network (Law & Wong, 1998) and since the sample in the current study was 
comprised of current students, this may have further increased the relevance of this 
referent group.  
 What was especially surprising was the evidence for negative higher order 
interactions. Although the strength of these interactions was small compared to those of 
the main effects (2% vs. 69% of the variance, respectively), these negative interactions 
suggest that there are situations where making more money compared to a given referent 
group can actually serve to decrease pay satisfaction. Upon closer examination, it appears 
that the effects of the different forms of equity may at times be contextually dependent 
(i.e., dependent on equity relative to other referent groups). Returning again to Figure 5 
(low internal equity), the line representing high external equity (i.e., higher relative pay) 
shows a surprising decrease in pay satisfaction as educational equity increases.  This 
corresponds to situations of underpayment in relation to internal coworkers (identified as 
the most important referent) and overpayment relative to external market value. Under 
these conditions, being underpaid relative to educational peers may be easily rationalized 
with the judgment that one’s fellow graduates are in a similar financial situation. But as 
educational equity rises, the fact that one is now paid better than both the external market 
and educational cohorts may make the internal underpayment equity all the more salient, 
which is consistent with the observed decrease in pay satisfaction. This is also consistent 
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with the idea that most individuals chronically report being underpaid (Lawler, 1987; 
Summers & DeNisi, 1990) and may look for evidence to support this idea. 
The notion of “looking for evidence” can also be seen by examining Figure 6 
(high internal equity). In this Figure, the line representing situations of negative external 
equity suggests that as educational equity increases, pay satisfaction once again 
decreases, which is the opposite of what equity theory would predict. However, it may be 
that under conditions of internal overpayment and external underpayment, an increase 
relative to an educational cohort makes the external underpayment more salient. 
Although these interactions suggest that it may be difficult to ever satisfy the pay needs 
of employees, it is once again important to note that the strength of these interactions are 
small compared to the main effects.  
Practically speaking, these results suggest that to the extent that organizations 
have control over discretionary pay, the internal referent appears to be the most salient 
consideration for individuals. However, given that the supply of financial incentives is 
finite, it is important for organizations to identify more cost effective, intangible 
incentives such as celebrating success and recognizing high performers.  
Between Person Analyses 
As was expected, there were modest intercorrelations between the different 
dimensions of the MOP. The strongest relationship was between the spending and 
motivational dimensions. These dimensions both appear to reflect aspects of the 
American dream, which has traditionally represented the idea that hard work will lead to 
fortune and the ability to acquire material goods (Furnham, 1998; Sheldon et al. 2001; 
Derber, 1979; Carnegie, 1936). In addition, the control dimension was related to relative 
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position. This may be because these both reflect meanings related to competence on the 
job. This status may be represented by both one’s perceived performance and level of 
control.   
It was also hypothesized that individual difference variables related to salary (i.e., 
equity sensitivity and the reflected meanings of pay) would be related to one another 
because both constructs reflect a concern for outcomes. Equity sensitivity was only 
marginally related to a summed composite of the meanings of money. However, equity 
sensitivity was related to both the motivational and spending components of the meaning 
of pay. These goals that are related to the “American dream” also appear to be related to 
equity sensitivity. Furthermore, although no specific predictions were made about the 
future referent group, the significant relationship between the future referent and the 
equity sensitivity construct is consistent with the theoretical rationale used to define the 
latter (Huseman et al. 1985; 1987). The future referent may also represent a 
conceptualization of self-worth.  
In addition, the motivation and spending meanings of pay were also related to 
race (coded White vs. minority) such that minorities were more likely to endorse these 
symbolic meanings. Once again, these are the meanings of pay associated with the 
notions of the American dream, however this finding may be specific to the sample. The 
current study had a high percentage of students who were of international origin. While 
merely speculative, it may be that masters programs (or even advanced degree programs 
in general) attract individuals who see a master’s degree as one way of achieving these 
principles that are consistent with the American dream. Consistent with this idea, post 
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hoc t-tests revealed significant differences between international and American students 
on those aforementioned meanings.   
Cross Level Analyses 
One of the principal goals of the current study was to investigate cross level 
relationships - - to see if either equity sensitivity or the meanings of pay moderated the 
relationship between equity and pay satisfaction. Despite the existence of three different 
forms of equity, only individual differences in the external referent-pay satisfaction 
relationship were moderated by the variables included in the current study. The cross-
level analyses indicated that there was a significant amount of between person variance to 
be explained in the internal and educational referent relationships, however none of the 
individual differences measured were shown to moderate these relationships.  
Despite the lack of cross-level effects for the internal and educational referent, 
there were explainable individual differences when it came to the external referent. 
Results indicated that individuals who were higher in entitlement and who saw more 
control and spending meanings of pay tended to perceive a stronger relationship between 
the external referent and their own pay satisfaction. This supports the idea that there are 
individuals who are more sensitive to differences between their own salary and that of 
others. This is consistent with previous studies that have found individuals high in 
entitlement to be sensitive to outputs (Allen & White, 2002). Nevertheless, it appears that 
the relative size of these effects is small when compared to the effects of equity itself.  
It is unclear why the moderated relationships were found with the external 
referent group exclusively. Sweeney & McFarlin (2005) have posited that the external 
referent may be particularly important because it provides individuals with relevant 
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market wage comparisons. They also suggest that the external referent may best be 
understood by a relative deprivation model. Relative deprivation (Crosby, 1982) suggests 
that reactions to fraternal deprivation are different than responses to egoistic deprivation. 
It may be the case that external referent comparisons represent fraternal deprivation, the 
sense that a group (in this case fellow employees) has been similarly wronged or 
deprived.  
Another potential explanation may be the experimental manipulation itself. The 
experimental manipulation did not take into account job performance (i.e., “inputs” in the 
language of Adams), and thus only reflected a comparison of outputs across a series of 
job offers. In a field sample, individuals may tend to have more information available 
about the relative inputs of internal referents as compared to those externally. Having this 
information about internal referents may potentially change the nature of the relationships 
observed in the current research. Equity theory (Adams, 1965) stresses the ratio of inputs 
to outputs, so it may be fruitful for future research to consider manipulating variables that 
represent workplace inputs.  
Conclusions 
It appears that all of the forms of equity (internal, external, and educational) 
measured in the current study are important to individuals and are substantially related to 
individual pay satisfaction. Furthermore, it appears that the internal referent may have the 
strongest impact on pay satisfaction as it satisfies individual preferences for referents that 
are both relevant and available.  
In sum, it is proposed that all of the referent groups are important, but their 
importance may be driven by different reasons. This would suggest that using a single 
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generalized referent as suggested elsewhere (e.g., Summers & DeNisi, 1990; Hills, 1980) 
may obscure the understanding of how different referent groups work to influence pay 
satisfaction.   
 The internal referent appears particularly important because when information 
about the internal referent is available, it has the strongest relationship with pay 
satisfaction. Furthermore, even though the internal referent appears to be the most salient 
referent, the external referent is essential to understand because perceptions of external 
equity are particularly sensitive to individual (cross-level) differences such as equity 
sensitivity, and certain symbolic meanings of pay. This inclination towards external 
comparisons may be driven by market wage comparisons or feelings of fraternal 
deprivation. Finally, it appears that educational equity is important because when 
information about the educational referent is available, it interacts with the other forms of 
equity to influence pay satisfaction, sometimes in the opposite direction that equity 
theory would predict. Thus, educational equity appears to be contextually dependent on 
the other forms of equity. Given that the coefficients associated with the educational 
referent are similar to those associated with the external referent, the educational referent 
may be an especially important external referent when considered in the context of other 
forms of equity. 
In sum, it appears that there are individual differences that influence sensitivity to 
equity, however these individual differences do not account for as much variance as 
perceptions of equity itself. The relationship between pay satisfaction and organizational 
attractiveness found in the current study begins to shed light on the practical importance 
of these results. If individuals perceive that they are inequitably paid, it may affect their 
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decision to enter or exit the organization. Understanding how individuals determine 
judgments of equity may help practitioners design compensation systems that are 
perceived as fair by employees, which in turn may help in the attraction and retention of 
high performers.  
Future Research Directions 
The three referent groups examined in the current study are by no means 
comprehensive or exhaustive of all possible referents. Future research should seek to 
develop a taxonomy of referent groups to guide future research. One promising area is 
the recent work of both Sweeney and McFarlin (2004) and Brygen (2004) who have 
found evidence for a referent representing comparisons against a national standard (i.e., 
compared to other people in your country). In fact, Sweeney and McFarlin’s (2004) 
cross-cultural research on referent groups found evidence that in the U.S., the best 
predictor of pay satisfaction was equity related to the national referent. Furthermore, the 
strength of this relationship was stronger in the U.S. than in any of 12 other countries.  
Although the discovery of promising moderating individual difference variables 
was limited in the current study, the results of the current cross level analyses suggest the 
potential for other individual differences that may serve as moderators. Other potential 
constructs such as motives for achievement and power may also moderate equity pay 
satisfaction relationships. Those individuals high in need for achievement may be more 
sensitive because their pay is symbolic of achievements, both on the job and in their 
career. Likewise, individuals high in a need for power may be more sensitive to the 
different forms of equity because money may reflect a desire for status. There are also 
other taxonomies of the meanings of money that may be related to equity and pay 
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satisfaction, such as Tang’s (1992) MES scale and Mitchell et al. (1998)’s Money 
Importance scale.  
 One further question for future research is to determine how these perceptions of 
equity may impact job satisfaction. Is there one form of equity that has a stronger 
relationship with job satisfaction? Does the strength of the relationship between job 
satisfaction and pay satisfaction differ between people?  
Finally, one potentially promising area of future research is to investigate other 
behavioral reactions to inequity. Participants in the current study seemed to react in 
similar ways to inequity in that there was more between scenario variance than between 
person variance in pay satisfaction. However, one potentially fruitful area for future 
research is the individual differences that emerge when a person is allowed to react in 
other ways than decreased pay satisfaction. As Adams (1965) has suggested, other 
reactions to inequity may include speaking out/complaining, badmouthing the 
organization, rationalization, job hunting, withholding effort, withholding OCB’s, etc. 
Future research should also investigate these options, as it is evident that equity still 
impacts perceptions of pay satisfaction. These unanswered questions make the area of 
referent related research a promising area for future research. 
Limitations
The current study was not without limitations. The first was that it was a lab study 
and used a series of artificial job scenarios. However, the manipulation check indicated 
that participants were sensitive to the experimental manipulation and changed their 
perceptions of equity based on manipulated cue values. In addition, the inclusion of two 
identical scenarios as a within person reliability check also indicated that participants 
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were engaged and responded consistently across the repeated measures of the task. Even 
so, future research should attempt to investigate these cross-level relationships in a field 
setting. 
Another limitation of the current study is that the salary of the targeted referent 
groups was made explicit and salient, which may not be the case in all organizational 
settings. Despite this limitation, there is evidence that others may hypothesize about the 
salary of others when faced with an absence of information (Lawler, 1987). Nevertheless, 
future research should investigate if individuals differentially search for information 
about referents when given the opportunity to conduct such a search.  
One additional limitation of the study is that only salary related information about 
each job offer was manipulated between scenarios, thus differences in perceptions of 
organizational attractiveness are likely to reflect differences in pay satisfaction 
experienced across scenarios. Future research should attempt to manipulate other 
potential inputs and outputs of the job in addition to pay. For example, a more rigorous 
test of the MOP would manipulate other features of the job such that one job offer may 
present the potential of more interesting work. Reflective theory would predict that 
individuals high on the MOP would be more attracted to the job with the high salary as 
opposed to the one with high intrinsic interest.  
Furthermore, not only are the features of a given job offer multidimensional, pay 
satisfaction itself is also multidimensional. Heneman (1985) has suggested that pay 
satisfaction actually has four levels. More recently, Tekleab, Bartol, and Liu (in press) 
have found evidence that a multidimensional consideration of this construct has 
explanatory power. They found that distributive justice had the strongest relationship 
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with pay level satisfaction while procedural justice had the strongest relationship with 
pay raise satisfaction. The authors suggest that procedural issues are more likely to be 
associated with turnover in organizations. From a practical point of view, this may also 
have the side effect of causing low performers to leave the organization.  
Finally, the sample of master’s level students in business may have presented a 
unique sample that limits the generalizability of the results. The sample tended to have 
more males, was particularly diverse cross-culturally, and had limited racial diversity 
among Americans. Furthermore, the nature of the sample of master’s students tends to be 
especially well-educated. Equally important, an open ended question at the end of the 
survey indicated many of the participants plan to enter jobs that focus on finances. As a 
result, this may have limited the variance in the individual difference measures related to 
money. Other professions and industries may have different expectations related to the 
earning power associated with their degree. Thus, future research should also attempt to 
expand the results of this research to a sample broader than that used in the current study.  
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APPENDIX A-TABLES  
 
Table 1 
Previous Empirical Attempts To Categorize Referent Groups 
Authors  Referent Dimensions Outcome Variables 
Homans (1953) Other coworkers Pay satisfaction  
Patchen (1961) Idealized self Absences 
Finn & Lee (1972) Internal 
External 
Pay satisfaction 
Goodman (1974)  Other  
System 
Self 
Pay satisfaction 
Heneman et al. (1978) Internal 
External 
Historical 
Cost of living 
Relatives & friends 
Pay satisfaction 
Austin, McGinn, Susmilch 
(1980) 
Future self 
Social comparisons 
Pay satisfaction 
Fairness perceptions 
Hills (1980)  Internal 
External 
Expected 
Past self 
Personal worth 
Friends & family 
Pay satisfaction 
Ease of finding work 
Ronen (1986)  Internal 
External 
No frame of reference 
Pay satisfaction 
Propensity to leave 
Oldham et al. (1986) Self inside 
Self outside 
Other inside 
Other outside 
Pay satisfaction 
Scholl et al. (1987) System 
Self 
Job 
Company 
Occupation 
Age 
Education 
Pay satisfaction 
Kulik & Ambrose (1988) Internal 
External 
Pay satisfaction 
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Authors  Referent Dimensions Outcome Variables 
Summers & DeNisi (1990) Other 
System 
Self 
Pay satisfaction 
Taylor & Vest (1992)  External 
Personal 
Economic 
Ego 
Pay satisfaction 
Blau (1994) Social  
Financial needs 
Historical 
Organizational (Internal) 
Market (External) 
Pay satisfaction 
Law & Wong (1998) Internal same job 
External same job 
Same education 
Family & friends 
Supervisors 
Pay satisfaction 
Brown (2001) Social  
Financial needs 
Historical 
Organizational (Internal) 
Market (External) 
Pay satisfaction 
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Table 2 
Dimensions & Sample Items of the Measurement of Money Meaning  
• Shameful Failure N/A 
• Social Acceptability N/A 
• Pooh-Pooh Attitude N/A 
• Moral Evil N/A 
• Comfortable Security N/A 
• Social 
Unacceptability 
N/A 
Wernimont & 
Fitzpatrick 
(1972) 
• Conservative 
Business Values 
N/A 
 
• Power/Prestige “In all honesty, I own nice things in order 
to impress others.” 
• Retention/Time “I put money aside on a regular basis for 
the future.” 
• Distrust “It bothers me when I discover I could 
have gotten something for less elsewhere.” 
• Quality “I spend more to get the very best.” 
Yamauchi & 
Templer (1982) 
• Anxiety “It’s hard for me to pass up a bargain.” 
 
• Obsession “I firmly believe that money can solve all 
of my problems.” 
• Power/Spending “I sometimes buy things that I don’t need 
or want to impress people because they are 
the right things to have at the time.”  
• Retention “I often say ‘I can’t afford it’ whether I can 
or not.”  
• Security/Conservative “I always know how much I have in my 
savings account.” 
• Inadequate “The amount of money I have saved is 
never quite enough.”  
Furnham(1984) 
• Effort/Ability “I believe that my present income is about 
what I deserve, given the job I do.” 
 
• Success “Money is a symbol of success.” 
• Budget “I use my money very carefully.” 
Tang (1992) 
• Evil “Money is the root of all evil.” 
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• Value importance “I believe that the more money you have, 
the happier you are.” 
• Personal involvement “I make out a budget for my expenditures.” 
• Time spent thinking 
about finances 
“I have explicit plans for how I can make 
more money.” 
• Knowledge of 
financial affairs 
“I am aware of the tax implications of my 
financial activities.” 
• Financial risk taking “I would prefer to win big or lose big than 
to be conservative.” 
• Skill at handling 
money 
“I never have checks that bounce.” 
Mitchell et al. 
(1998) 
• Power/Status “I use money to influence others.” 
 
• Positive Motives “To get just compensation for my efforts.” 
• Negative Motives  “To prove that I am not as dumb as some 
people assumed.” 
Srivastava, 
Locke, and 
Bartol (2001) 
• Freedom of Action “To implement my ideas by starting my 
own business.” 
 
• Motivational “My income enables me to enhance 
personal growth.” 
• Relative Position “Through my income I learn the priorities 
in my work.” 
• Control “Through my income I learn how 
influential my opinion is.”  
Thierry (1992) 
• Spending “My income enables me to acquire luxury 
goods and services.”  
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Table 3 
Item Level Proportions of Substantive Agreement and Substantive Validity Coefficients 
# Item psa csv
 Motivation   
1 My pay should enable me to enhance personal growth. .64 .36 
2 My pay should enable me to establish contacts off the job.  .86 .71 
3 My pay should enable me to be recognized in society.  .93 .86 
4 My pay should enable me to achieve a stable way of life.  .57 .14 
5 My pay should enable me to acquire recognition from family and 
friends.  .86 .79 
6 My pay should enable me to show off my success.*  .64 .29 
7 My pay should enable me to be admired for my success.*  .79 .64 
8 My pay should enable me to be respected for my success.*  .86 .79 
 Relative Position   
9 Through my pay I learn how well I meet job expectations. 1.0 1.0 
10 Through my pay I learn the priorities in my work. .79 .57 
11 Through my pay I learn the extent to which I perform my job efficiently 1.0 1.0 
12 Through my pay I learn how well I perform in comparison with my 
colleagues. .93 .86 
13 Through my pay I learn the amount of effort I put in my job. 1.0 1.0 
14 Through my pay I learn the extent to which I put the right amount of 
effort in my job as compared to others.*  1.0 1.0 
15 Through my pay I learn the extent to which my performance is valued in 
relation to my colleagues.* .93 .86 
16 Through my pay I learn how well I took on and completed hard projects 
at work.*   .93 .86 
 Control   
17 Through my pay I learn how much freedom I have to do things my own 
way.  .86 .79 
18 Through my pay I learn what people think of my work. .93 .86 
19 Through my pay I learn how responsible I am for the work of others. .79 .64 
20 Through my pay I learn how influential my opinion is. .93 .86 
21 Through my pay I learn how important my work is to the organization. .36 -.07 
22 Through my pay I learn how much influence I have upon the activities 
of my department. .93 .86 
23 Through my pay I learn how influential I have been concerning the 
operation of the organization. .36 -.14 
24 Through my pay I learn how satisfied the customers of the organization 
are.* .86 .71 
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 Spending   
25 My pay should enable me to buy what I want. 1.0 1.0 
26 My pay should enable me to go on vacation as I want. .71 .57 
27 My pay should enable me to live a luxurious life. 1.0 1.0 
28 My pay should enable me to attain a desirable standard of living. 1.0 1.0 
29 My pay should enable me to be well off. .86 .71 
30 My pay should enable me to purchase the goods and services I desire. 1.0 1.0 
31 My pay should enable me to acquire luxury goods and services. 1.0 1.0 
32 My pay should enable me to live where ever I want.* .86 .79 
Note. * indicates new items generated by the first author. 
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Table 4 
Standardized Factor Loadings from Initial Confirmatory Factor Analysis of MOP Items 
# Item Factor Loadings
 Motivation  
2 My pay should enable me to establish contacts off the job.* .50 
3 My pay should enable me to be recognized in society.  .82 
5 My pay should enable me to acquire recognition from family and friends.  .92 
8 My pay should enable me to be respected for my success. .75 
 Relative Position  
9 Through my pay I learn how well I meet job expectations. .62 
11 Through my pay I learn the extent to which I perform my job efficiently .72 
12 Through my pay I learn how well I perform in comparison with my 
colleagues. .77 
13 Through my pay I learn the amount of effort I put in my job. .91 
14 Through my pay I learn the extent to which I put the right amount of effort in 
my job as compared to others. .80 
15 Through my pay I learn the extent to which my performance is valued in 
relation to my colleagues.* .40 
16 Through my pay I learn how well I took on and completed hard projects at 
work.   .75 
 Control  
17 Through my pay I learn how much freedom I have to do things my own 
way.*  .49 
18 Through my pay I learn what people think of my work.* .51 
20 Through my pay I learn how influential my opinion is. .66 
22 Through my pay I learn how much influence I have…. .54 
24 Through my pay I learn how satisfied the customers of the organization are. .62 
 Spending  
25 My pay should enable me to buy what I want. .67 
27 My pay should enable me to live a luxurious life. .89 
28 My pay should enable me to attain a desirable standard of living.* .36 
29 My pay should enable me to be well off. .60 
30 My pay should enable me to purchase the goods and services I desire. .66 
31 My pay should enable me to acquire luxury goods and services. .91 
32 My pay should enable me to live where ever I want. .81 
Note. Meaning of pay scale (MOP). *Indicates items that were subsequently dropped from 
final scales.  
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Table 5 
Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Correlations of Within Person Variables 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Internal Equity -42.02 1364.17 --     
2. External Equity 85.46 1305.36 .45* --    
3. Educational Equity -1.13 1383.36 .48* .56* --   
4. Pay Satisfaction 4.21 1.76 .65* .56* .58* (.95)  
5. Organizational Attractiveness 4.18 1.86 .61* .58* .61* .87* -- 
Note. Equity in US dollars. N = 2886 observations. Reliability of the multi-item measure 
is indicated in parentheses.  
* p < .05 
 
 
   
 
 
Table 6 
Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Correlations of Between Person Variables 
Variable M SD N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Race 2.1 1.4 85           
2. International 1.4 0.5 102 .52**          
3. Gender 1.3 0.5 101 -.05 .05         
4. Age 28.5 3.1 98 .07 .37** -.13        
5. Future Referent 86024 10981 84 -.08 -.06 .01 .08       
6. MOP: 
Motivation 3.3 0.9 107 .25* .29** .03 -.01 -.11 (.81)     
7. MOP: Relative 
Position 3.7 0.8 107 -.08 .03 -.04 .09 -.03 .10 (.87)    
8. MOP: Control 3.2 0.8 107 .06 .14 .00 .10 -.17 .27** .35** (.71)   
9. MOP: 
Spending 3.7 0.8 107 .21* .17 .03 -.10 .06 .40** .07 .17 (.89)  
10. ESI 24.5 5.9 107 .11 .19 .00 .14 -.28** -.26** .13 -.08 -.22* (.69)
Note. Data is coded such that higher numbers indicate International status and the female gender. Future referent in US 
dollars. Meaning of pay (MOP).  Equity sensitivity instrument (ESI) coded such that higher scores are associated with the 
Benevolent response.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 7 
Level 1 Simultaneous Model of Equity and Pay Satisfaction 
 Pay Satisfaction 
Variable Coefficient SEa t Varianceb
Intercept, β0 4.25 .06 76.11† .291 
Main Effects     
Internal, β1 .702 .04 17.68† .131 
External, β2 .431 .03 16.23† .034 
Educational, β3 .394 .03 14.08† .047 
Two way Interactions     
Internal X External, β4 .004 .02 .24 .001 
Internal X Educational, β5 -.005 .02 -.34 .006 
External X Educational, β6 -.053 .01 -3.95† .002 
Three way interaction     
Internal X External X Educational, β7 -.103 .01 -9.48† .003 
Note. N = 105.   Average estimated a SE of the Level 1 regression coefficients. b 
Variance in Level 1 parameter estimates.  
† p < .001 
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Table 8 
Results of Hierarchical Linear Modeling Level 2 Analysis for Equity Sensitivity 
 Pay satisfaction 
Variable Coefficient SE t 
Internal, β1    
 Equity Sensitivity, γ11 .00 .00 .14 
External, β2    
 Equity Sensitivity, γ21 -.01 .00 -2.39* 
Educational, β3    
 Equity Sensitivity, γ31 -.00 .01 -.15    
Note. N = 105.  
* p < .05 
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Table 9 
Results of Hierarchical Linear Modeling Level 2 Analysis for the Meaning of Pay 
(MOP) 
 Pay satisfaction 
Variable Coefficient SE t 
Internal, β1    
 MOP, γ11 .01 .01 .58 
External, β2    
 MOP, γ21 .02 .01 1.86 
Educational, β3    
 MOP, γ31 .01 .01 .409 
Note. N = 105.  
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Table 10 
Results of Hierarchical Linear Modeling Level 2 Analysis for Relative Position 
 Pay satisfaction 
Variable Coefficient SE t 
Internal, β1    
 Relative Position, γ11 .02 .04 .51 
External, β2    
 Relative Position, γ21 .01 .03 .43 
Educational, β3    
 Relative Position, γ31 .03 .04 .84 
Note. N = 105.  
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Table 11 
Results of Hierarchical Linear Modeling Level 2 Analysis for Control 
 Pay satisfaction 
Variable Coefficient SE t 
Internal, β1    
 Control, γ11 .08 .05 1.70 
External, β2    
 Control, γ21 .08 .03 2.29* 
Educational, β3    
 Control, γ31 .03 .03 .87 
Note. N = 105.  
* p < .05 
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Table 12 
Results of Hierarchical Linear Modeling Level 2 Analysis for Motivational Properties 
 Pay satisfaction 
Variable Coefficient SE t 
Internal, β1    
 Motivational properties, γ11 .01 .04 .26 
External, β2    
 Motivational properties, γ21 .01 .03 .46 
Educational, β3    
 Motivational properties, γ31 .00 .02 .17 
Note. N = 105.  
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Table 13 
Results of Hierarchical Linear Modeling Level 2 Analysis for Final Post Hoc Model 
 Pay satisfaction 
Variable Coefficient SE t 
External, β2    
 ESI, γ21 -.01 .00 -2.06* 
 Control, γ22  .06 .03 2.07* 
Note. N = 105. Equity sensitivity instrument (ESI).  
* p < .05  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   85 
 
APPENDIX B-FIGURES 
Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Theoretical model supported by previous research (e.g., Hills (1980); Taylor & 
Vest, 1992) of referent equity relating to pay satisfaction.   
Figure 2. Hypothesized model of the current study, relating referent equity to pay 
satisfaction, moderated by the meaning of pay. 
Figure 3. Hypothesized model relating equity perceptions to pay satisfaction, moderated 
by equity sensitivity. 
Figure 4. Exploratory model relating equity sensitivity to the originally hypothesized 
model.  
Figure 5. Line graph portraying the three way interaction between the forms of equity for 
conditions of low internal equity. 
Figure 6. Line graph portraying the three way interaction between the forms of equity for 
conditions of high internal equity.  
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 3. 
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Figure 4. 
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Figure 5. 
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Figure 6. 
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Appendix C 
Short Construct Definitions for the Meaning of Pay Scale Used in Substantive Validity 
Assessment 
 
Control: My pay represents how much power and control I have in my work 
environment. 
 
Motivational: My pay represents a way to achieve abstract intangible goals such as 
security, recognition, & status. 
 
Performance: My pay tells me how well I’m performing up to standards and how well 
I’m doing compared to others.   
 
Spending: My pay represents an ability to buy the things that I want.  
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Appendix D 
Instructions: 
In this section you are asked to describe what pay means to you. Pay refers to your total income and includes 
your salary, bonuses and fringe benefits such as medical insurance, savings or pension plans, as well as 
income from profit and gain sharing plans. We use the term pay to refer to all these components. Please 
indicate for each item the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. The right answer is the 
one which represents most closely how you feel. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly  
Agree 
 
1. My pay should enable me to enhance personal growth. 1     2     3     4     5 
2. My pay should enable me to establish contacts off the job.  1     2     3     4     5 
3. My pay should enable me to be recognized in society.  1     2     3     4     5 
4. My pay should enable me to achieve a stable way of life.  1     2     3     4     5 
5. My pay should enable me to acquire recognition from family and friends.  1     2     3     4     5 
6. My pay should enable me to show off my success.  1     2     3     4     5 
7. My pay should enable me to be admired for my success.  1     2     3     4     5 
8. My pay should enable me to be respected for my success.  1     2     3     4     5 
9. Through my pay I learn how well I meet job expectations. 1     2     3     4     5 
10. Through my pay I learn the priorities in my work. 1     2     3     4     5 
11. Through my pay I learn the extent to which I perform my job efficiently 1     2     3     4     5 
12. Through my pay I learn how well I perform in comparison with my 
colleagues. 
1     2     3     4     5 
13. Through my pay I learn the amount of effort I put in my job. 1     2     3     4     5 
14. Through my pay I learn the extent to which I put the right amount of effort 
in my job as compared to others.  
1     2     3     4     5 
15. Through my pay I learn the extent to which my performance is valued in 
relation to my colleagues.  
1     2     3     4     5 
16. Through my pay I learn how well I took on and completed hard projects at 
work.   
1     2     3     4     5 
17. Through my pay I learn how much freedom I have to do things my own 
way.  
1     2     3     4     5 
18. Through my pay I learn what people think of my work. 1     2     3     4     5 
19. Through my pay I learn how responsible I am for the work of others. 1     2     3     4     5 
20. Through my pay I learn how influential my opinion is. 1     2     3     4     5 
21. Through my pay I learn how important my work is to the organization. 1     2     3     4     5 
22. Through my pay I learn how much influence I have upon the activities of 
my department. 
1     2     3     4     5 
23. Through my pay I learn how influential I have been concerning the 
operation of the organization. 
1     2     3     4     5 
24. Through my pay I learn how satisfied the customers of the organization 
are. 
1     2     3     4     5 
25. My pay should enable me to buy what I want. 1     2     3     4     5 
26. My pay should enable me to go on vacation as I want. 1     2     3     4     5 
27. My pay should enable me to live a luxurious life. 1     2     3     4     5 
28. My pay should enable me to attain a desirable standard of living. 1     2     3     4     5 
29. My pay should enable me to be well off. 1     2     3     4     5 
30. My pay should enable me to purchase the goods and services I desire. 1     2     3     4     5 
31. My pay should enable me to acquire luxury goods and services. 1     2     3     4     5 
32. My pay should enable me to live where ever I want.  1     2     3     4     5 
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Appendix E 
 
Instructions: 
The questions below ask what you’d like for your relationship to be with any organization for which you 
might work. On each question, divide 10 points between the two choices (choice A and choice B) by giving 
the most points to the choice that is most like you and the fewest points to the choice that is least like you. 
You can, if you’d like, give the same number of points to both choices (for example, 5 points to choice A and 
5 points to choice B). And you can use zeros if you’d like.  
Just be sure to allocate all 10 points per question between each pair of possible responses.  
 
In any organization I might work for: 
1) It would be more important for me to: 
            A.  Get from the organization 
    B.  Give to the organization 
 
 
2) It would be more important for me to: 
            A.  Help others 
            B.  Watch out for my own good 
 
 
3) I would be more concerned about: 
            A.  What I received from the organization 
            B.  What I contributed to the organization 
 
 
4) The hard work I do should:  
            A.  Benefit the organization 
            B.  Benefit me 
 
 
5) My personal philosophy in dealing with the organization would be  
            A.  If I don’t look out for myself, nobody else will 
            B.  It’s better for me to give than receive  
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Appendix F 
Pay Differential Manipulation 
A corporate recruiter has contacted you about a potential job offer hired at an Associate level. This job has 
a salary structure that will be outlined below.  
 
Assuming that the new job offers monthly pay of $5067, please indicate how satisfied you would be if the 
average monthly pay of the following groups of people were:  
 $5067 for the other Associates at the same level in your organization  
 $5067 for Associates at the same level in other organizations in this industry  
$5067 for people with similar education and experience as you
$5067 for your salary offer 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Extremely 
Dissatisfied 
  Don’t Know  Extremely 
Satisfied 
Based on this scenario, how satisfied are you with:  
1. The amount of pay you receive 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
2. The degree to which you are fairly paid for what you contribute to the 
organization 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
Based on this scenario, how satisfied are you with your pay as 
compared to :
 
3. the other Associates in your organization 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
4. Associates in other organizations  1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
5. people with similar education and experience as you 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
6. the real job you have currently 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Extremely 
Unlikely  
  Don’t Know  Extremely 
Likely  
7. Based on this scenario, how likely are you to accept a job with this 
organization? 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
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Appendix G 
CRFF-34-1 Treatment Interaction Design (Connor & Zelen, 1959) 
aj = Participant 
Salary 
bk = Internal 
Referent Salary 
cl = External 
Referent Salary 
dm = Educational 
Referent Salary 
a0 = low 
a1 = medium 
a2 = high 
b0 = low 
b1 = medium 
b2 = high 
c0 = low 
c1 = medium 
c2 = high 
d0 = low 
d1 = medium 
d2 = high 
 
Scenario # Treatment Combination 
1 a0b0c0d0
2 a1b2c1d2
3 a2b1c2d1
4 a0b0c2d1
5 a1b2c0d0
6 a2b1c1d2
7 a0b0c1d2
8 a1b2c2d1
9 a2b1c0d0
10 a0b1c0d2
11 a1b0c1d1
12 a2b2c2d0
13 a0b1c2d0
14 a1b0c0d2
15 a2b2c1d1
16 a0b1c1d1
17 a1b0c2d0
18 a2b2c0d2
19 a0b2c0d1
20 a1b1c1d0
21 a2b0c2d2
22 a0b2c2d2
23 a1b1c0d1
24 a2b0c1d0
25 a0b2c1d0
26 a1b1c2d2
27 a2b0c0d1
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